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INTRODUCTION 
1. Purpose of Thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to present a critical 
investigation of Bishop Butler•s moral philosophy. The 
objective is two-fold, including both exposition and evalu-
ation. 
2. Limitations 
This is not a study of Butler•s philosophy of reli-
gion, nor of his theology, except insofar as these topics 
overlap with the essentials of his moral philosophy. Further-
more, evaluation of Butler's moral philosophy is done only 
from a philosophic point of view. Evaluation from a 
theological standpoint is beyond the scope of the present 
study~ 
3 • Methodology 
Chapter I sets forth the general context of Butler 1 s 
life and times. Actual exposition of his thought begins in 
Chapter II with the question of man•s nature. Chapter III 
sets forth .. ~the formal nature of morality and of moral value 
in Butler~s system, and it also seeks to relate morality, 
-1-
0 
0 
0 
thus formally conceived in terms of fidelity to nature, 
to the essential content of human nature in Butlerrs 
system. 
The nature and criterion of right, together with 
the reality, status, and authority of conscience as the 
supreme regulative faculty are thus indicated in 
Chapters II and III. At this point in the study it 
becomes necessary to consider the nature of moral discern-
ment. This is the topic of Chapter IV in which the 
cognitive status and the cognitive grounds of moral 
judgment are explored. 
In Chapter V the study of Butler•s moral 
philosophy is .concluded with a summary of the foregoing 
exposition and evaluation. 
2 
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CHAPTER I 
THE CONTEXT OF BUTLER 1 S WORK 
1. England in Butler~s Day 
The life of Bishop Butler covered the years 1692-
1752. This was a time in the history of England when reli-
gion and morality were at a low ebb. nReligion was in a 
resting stage, worn out with the theological excitements of 
the seventeenth century and awaiting the revival which was 
to take place in the latter part of the eighteenth.n1 Beach 
and Neibuhr characterize Butler's age thus: "The Puritan 
fires of moral zeal and reform had died down, and the reli-
gious life of England had considerably settled into a state 
of placid respectability. Puritanism ••• had hardened 
. . 2 into a kind of biblical scholast~c~sm.n 
i. Religious Faith in Relation to Reason 
In Butler's day the theological foundations of 
1 C. D. Broad,. ••Butler as a Moralist, •r Hibbert Journal, 
22 (1923) 1 44 • 
2waldo Beach, and H. Richard Niebuhr (eds~), 
Christian Ethics (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1955), 
Introduction to chapter xi, "Joseph Butler and Anglican 
Rationalism; n p. 327. 
-3-
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' morality were under serious attack in many quarters~ It may 
be of some interest to set this issue before us in historical 
perspective. With respect to the issue of faith versus 
reason, the history of Christian thought might be sketched 
t 
1 
thus: First there was the rise of Christianity with its 
prophetic articulation in the first century. The issue of 
faith versus reason became explicit a bit later through the 
encounter of Christianity with Greek and Latin forms o£ 
thought. The great apologists of these centuries seemed to 
assume the inevitable consonance of faith and reason, In 
Augustine, for instance, faith initiates a healing process in 
the soul so that reason may see clearly. This sort of 
synthesis dominated the early and middle medieval period. 
Following this era, however~ there began to emerge a way of 
thinking in which faith and reason tended to occupy separate 
domains. Gradually, the domain o£ faith became more and more 
inclusive until there was very little adventure left in the 
exercise of pure reason. At this point in our survey, we 
might distinguish between a secular and a religious line of 
thought. On the secular side, those who were not interested 
lThe broad outlines of this sketch are suggested in 
part by Horace T~ Lavely in 'r.Bishop Butler's Defense of 
Morality and Religionm (unpublished Th.D~ dissertation, 
School of Theology, Boston University, 1938) f pp. 58-61. 
5 
in the mere recapitulation of seholastic theology found a 
more exciting pursuit in the study of ancient "pagan" 
literature. This as a secular pursuit later becam~ supple-
mented, and partly replaced by a growing interest in nature. 
This interest in nature had a strong influence upon the 
intellectual atmosphere of seventeenth and eighteenth 
century England. We see a certain idealization of nature, 
with appeals to nature as a criterion of right in moral 
philosophy, together with the broader development of empiri-
cism in science and philosophy. These emphases are central 
in the writings of Bishop Butler. 
In the history of Christian thought, we have seen 
the displacement of reason by faith. The Catholic tradi-
tion of biblical interpretation became the ultimate author-
ity in matters of religious doctrine and of moral conduct. 
The Protestant reformers replaced belief in ecclesiastical 
authority with belief in the bible as the ultimate author-
ity. Following the reformation, religious contro-
versy, among Protestants, and between Protestants and 
Catholics, hastened the decline of public confidence in any 
sort of appeal to authority, whether biblical or ecclesiasti-
cal. In the Protestant tradition, particularly in England, 
the authority of revelation was replaced by the authority of 
0 
0 
0 
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natural reason. At this point, the almost complete submer-
gence of reason by faith had changed into its opposite,::: the 
submergence of faith by reason. In many circLes this triumph 
of reason brought about the complete demise of religious 
faith. Particularly in urban society, those who professed 
any degree whatsoever of intellectual informedness were much 
occupied with the ridicule and disparagement .of· religious 
belief. Butler himself characterized the situation in these 
words: 
It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted, by 
many persons, that Christianity is not so much as a sub-
ject of inquiry1 but that it is now at length, discovered 
to be fictitious. And accordingly they treat it, as ifr 
in the present age, this were an agreed point among all 
people of discernment; and nothing remained, but to set 
it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as 
it were by way of reprisals, for its having so long 
interrupted the pleasures of the world.l 
Orthodox christian apologists and skeptical deists 
generally held one fundamental tenet in common~ that reli-
gious faith must be rigorously tested by reason, and that 
nothing should be retained as a part of christian belief 
which does not meet this test. Typical of this prevailing 
attitude was a book by Toland, published in 1697 with the 
(inept) title, Christianity not Mysterious. Also typical was 
1Joseph Butler, Works, edited by W. E. Gladstone 
(2 vols.; Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1896), I, 1-2. All 
citations in this study are from the 1896 edition by 
Gladstone. There is also an 1897 edition of the same work 
by Gladstone, but the pagination is different. 
7 
a work by Matthew Tindal published in 1730 with the title 
Christianity as Old as the Creationi Or the Gospel, a 
Republication of the Religion of Nature. Butler was very 
much a part of his age~ He also did not dispute the 
contemporary primacy of reason but rather sought within that 
framework to defend morality and religion. 
Today, eighteenth century insistence upon reason and 
its primacy seems a bit otiose in the absence of clear 
definitions. "Reason" was a very inclusive term~ Among its 
several connotations were those of common sense and of uni-
versality. That the dictates of reason were less than 
coercive or universal was hardly suspected. The idea of 
reason overlapped with that of nature. "To act 'according to 
nature' meant to act according to reason, and, as reason was 
invariant 1 action according to it was always the same for all ~ 
1 people. 11 With Samuel Clarke 1 rational judgment seemed to 
include esthetic and value judgment. Ideals of reverence, 
equityr benevolence, and self-preservation were held to be 
cogni~ed by rational intuition, and to have the same 
2 
. indubitability as mathematical truths~ The eighteenth 
lE. C~ Messner, Bishop Butler and the Aqe of Reason 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936), p. 25. 
2w. R. Matthews (ed.), Fifteen Sermons Preached at 
the Rolls Chapel and a Dissertation upon the Nature of Virtue 
by Joseph Butler {4ondon: G. Bell and Sons Ltdw; 1958), p. xix. 
0 
0 
0 
8 
century appeal to reason was thus very broad and included 
both predominantly rationalist and predominantly empiricist 
emphases. The ideal of fidelity to nature was also often 
conceived broadly and somewhat imprecisely. 
ii. Moral Philosophy 
The philosophic, as well as the theological found-
ations or morality were under serious attack in Butler 1 s day. 
Seventy-five years before the publication of Butler's sermons, 
Thomas Hobbes had published the last of his major works, The 
Leviathan. Hobbes had'been the first philosopher to apply 
systematically •tthe basic assumptions of seventeenth-century 
. 1 
science to human behavJ.our." At that time scientists were 
greatly enamored with recently discovered principles of 
mechanics, and the consequent view of man in the philosophy ' 
of Hobbes was likewise mechanistic. According to this view, 
the human psyche itself is uultimately reducible to material 
bodies in motion.n2 In the natural state of man there are 
two categories of desire: the desire for pleasure and the 
1Ethel M. Albert, Theodore c .. Denise, and Sheldon P. 
Peterfreund, Great Traditions in Ethics: An Introduction 
(New York: American Book Company, 1953), p. 135. 
9 
/ 
desire for self-preservation. In a less primitive state, 
contemplation of the future evokes a third kind of desire: 
the desire for power. At heart, man is thus purely egoistic. 
He desires three things: pleasure, preservation, and power. 
~e maximum possible fulfilment of human egoism calls for 
social organization under the command of a sovereign ruler. 
The fiat of the ruler is the sole ground of morality. 
Benevolence is simply a disguised form of egoism. 
There is yet another passion sometimes called love, but 
·more properly good-will or charity~ There can be no 
greater argument to a man, of his own power, than to 
find himself able not only to accomplish his own 
desires, but also to assist other men in theirs: and 
this is that conception wherein consisteth_charity. 2 
The emotion of pity is. likewise reducible to egoism. 
Pity is imagination or fiction of future calamity to 
ourselves, proceeding from the sense of another man•s 
calamity. But when it lighteth on such as we think 
have not deserved the same, the compassion is greater, 
because then there appeareth more probability that the 
same may happen to us: for, the evil that happeneth 
to an innocent man, may happen to every man. 2 
A contemporary eighteenth century exponent of Hobbesian 
egoism was Bernard De Mandeville. In his nEnquiry into the 
Origin of Moral Virtue,tt benevolence is, in effect, regarded 
1Thomas Hobbes, Of Human Nature 1 ix, 17~ 
Selby~Bigge, British Moralists, vol. II {Oxford: 
Pre~s, 1897), p. 299. 
2Ibid., ix, 10; p. 298. 
Cited from 
~he Clarendon 
0 
0 
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as, a form of pride. The account runs thus: Basically 1 man 
1 is extraordinarily nselfish and headstrongn and virtue is 
2 
"contrary to the impulse of his nature.n Force alone can-
not subdue his indomitable egoism. Man is extremely vulner-
able, however 1 to flattery 1 which appeals to his pride. 
Early in history, the leaders of organized human society 
("wily politicians") learned to relate behavior to the 
developing notions of honor and shame. When suitable conno-
tations had become attached to these notions 1 •rpublic 
spiritedness" and other forms of seemingly non-egoistic 
activity became necessary to man 1 s self-esteem, and to his 
public reputation. Thus, "the moral virtues are the politi-
3 
cal offspring which flattery begot upon prideLn 
A basically egoistic interpretation of human morality 
came to dominate a great deal of popular thought on the 
subject, and it was highly fashionable to deride the possi-
bility of acting from genuine motives of charity or 
4 benevolence. 
1l3ernard De Mandeville, 11An Enquiry into the Origin 
of Moral Virtue." Cited from Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, 
II, 348. 
2Ibid., p. 352. 
4l3road; p.._ 45. 
3Ibid. I p. 353" 
11 
Philosophic opposition to the Hobbesian position took 
various forms. John Locke accepted the psychological egoism 
of Hobbes and likewise found rrthe motive and sanction of 
1 
virtue in self-interest.rr However, it was the fiat of God 
rather than that of an earthly sovereign which men were 
ultimately obliged to obey, and it was in the (probable) 
knowledge of divine rewards and punishments that man•s self-
interest found its greatest incentive. 
In opposition to both Hobbes and Locke was the 
rationalist approach to ethical theory. Here it was insisted 
that morality is ultimately grounded, neither in mere fiat , 
nor in merely utilitarian considerations, but rather in the 
structure of reality itself. Morality is natural in the 
deepest sense~ rather than merely conventional. According 
to Benjamin Whichcote, for instance, mo:al truths 
have a deeper Foundation, greater Ground for them, than 
that God gave the Law on Mount Sinai • • • For God made 
Man to them ••• and wrought his Law upon Men's Hearts; 
and, as it were interwove it into the Principles of our 
Reason; and the things thereof are the very Sense of 
~anrs Soul, and the Image of his Mind: So that a Man 
doth undo his own Principles, when he is disobedient and 
unconformable to them.2 
1Jarnes Seth, Enqlish Philosophers and Schools of 
Philosophy (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1912}, p. 188. 
2Benjarnin Whichcote, The Glorious Evidence and Power 
of Divine Truth, Cited from The Cambridqe Platonists, edited 
by E. T. Carnpagnac (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) , p~ 4f. 
12 
Other, and somewhat better known representatives of 
rationalism in ethical theory included Ralph Cudworth, Henry 
More, Samuel Clarke, and William Wollaston. These men con-
tended that all knowledge, that of morality no less than that 
of mathematics 1 is concerned with ideas which are fixed, 
universal, and rationally coercive. Butler was probably 
better acquamDtead with the work of Samuel Clarke than with 
that o£ any other of the rationalist school. 1 ·Typical of 
Clarke 1 s thought is this statement; 
The same necessary and eternal different relations, 
that different things bear one to another, and the 
same consequent fitness or unfitness of the application 
of different things or different relations one to 
another, with regard to which, the will of God always 
and necessarily does determine itself ••• ought like-
wise constantly to determine the wills of all sub-
ordinate rational beings •••• These eternal and neces-
. sary differences of things make it fit and reasonable 
for creatures so to act • • • even separate from the 
consideration of these rules being the positive will of 
God, and also antecedent to any respect or regard, 
expectation or apprehension, of any particular private 
and personal advantage or disadvantage reward or punish-
ment, either present or future.2 
Another line of opposition to Hobbes was represented 
by the philosophy of Lord Shaftesbury. Like the rationalists, 
1Matthews, pp. xvii-xix. 
2samuel Clarke, A Discourse concerninq the Unchange-
able Obligations of Natural Religion. Cited from The 
Classical Moralists, edited by Benjamin Rand (Boston, New 
York, and Chicago: Houghton Mifflin Company), p. 310. 
13 
Shaftesbury found the metaphysical ground of morality in the 
total structure of reality, of which man•s nature was a part. 
The rationalists, however, had made moral judgment a matter 
of pure, cognition in which ~eeling, or taste played no part. 
For Shaftesbury, the individual 1 s attunement with the larger 
structure of reality becomes evident through his psychologi-
cal sensibilities, or moral taste, as much, if not more so 
than through his rational intuition. Thus Shaftesbury speaks 
of the 11moral sense" which discerns the inherent beauty or 
deformity of affections and of actions. The naturalness o'f 
morality thus includes psychological or esthetic taste, and 
it is through this, rather than through purely rational 
cognition that man achieves his proper orderedness. 
We shall see that Butler's approach to ethical theory 
has strong affinities to that of Shaftesbury, though at 
certain crucial points ~utler does seek to correct and to 
supplement the latter. 
iii. General Morality 
The eighteenth century was noted for moral laxity. 
It is possible to interpret this as a consequence of the 
sustained attack upon the theoretical foundations (theologi-
cal and philosophic) gf morality. However, ·this cause - -,~ 
14 
was undoubtedly interrelated with a complex of others. The 
seventeenth century had been one of great, sacrifices for 
passionately espoused, but conflicting national ideals~ The 
English people had finally become weary of ideals and of 
heroism. Also the strictness of puritanism had evoked an 
opposite reaction in the national temper.· Thus there were 
psychological factors leading to moral laxity in practicer 
and in theory, to disparagement of heroic disinterestedness. 
Material prosperity with the growth of luxury is also often 
cited as a cause of the moral indifference of that time.· 
Whatever the primary causes were, the first part of 
the eighteenth century "was a period essentially irreligiousr 
with a moral tone seldom lower 1 and a moral apathy rarely 
paralleled in the.nation•s history."1 There was an alarming 
increase in drunkenness. Travellers on public roads were in 
constant danger of being robbed. For two centuries, highway-
men had been a constant threat but ,.they reached the zenith 
2 
of their fame" in the eighteenth century.. "All the 
1Horace T. Lavely, "Bishop Butler's Defense of 
Morality and Religion" (Unpublished Th.D .. dissertationr 
School of Theologyr Boston University, 1938), p .. 9. 
2
william Connor Sydney, England and the English in 
the Eighteenth Century (London: Ward and Down~y 1 1892), II, 
29 .. 
1 
approaches to the capitol were in·fested with them. 11 
15 
English shipping merchants were deeply involved in 
the slave trade~ Because of its commercial benefitsr the 
bishops and clergy generally declined to condemn it. Nepo-
tism and bribery were not uncommon in the church.. 11 0ne 
ambitious prelate bought a coveted bishopric for five 
thousand poundsr through the crafty expedient of betting· 
that amount with the kingrs favorite mistress that he would 
b . d 2 not e appo~nte . 11 Several of the English sovereigns lived 
openly with mistresses and there were also cases of open and 
unchallenged immorality among the clergy. It was not un-
usual for an aristocratic father to instruct his son in the 
. h' d . 3 genteel art of seduct~on as a part of ~s e ucat~on. 
It would be quite possible to dwell upon the nega-
tive aspects of English life in the eighteenth century at 
considerabie lengthr but the foregoing sketch will suffice 
for the purposes of this study. It is always difficult to 
compare the merits of one age with those of anotherr and the 
eighteenth century was not without its merits as well as 
demerits. 
2 Lavelyr pp. 13-14. 
3Ibid., p. 19f,.. 
16 
2. The Life of Butler 
i. Background~ Education, and Character 
Joseph Butler was born at Wantage, England, a market 
town in Berkshire, on May 18 1 1692. He was the youngest 
child in a family of eight. His father, Thomas Butler, had 
been a prosperous linen draper, but had retired from busi-
ness before Joseph•s birth. Butler•s family was Presbyterian. 
Thomas Butler 1 recognizing his son 1 s talent, resolved upon 
having him trained for the Presbyterian ministry. After 
beginning his education at the Wantage grammar s'chool, Joseph 
was sent to Tewskesbury Academy, a private.institution where 
dissenters from Anglicanism were able to gain a formal edu-
cation of university calibre. 
Sketches of Butler!s life nearly always include some 
notice of his correspondence with Dr. Samuel Clarke, the 
eminent philosophical theologian of that time. Butler•s 
mind was busy with a search for rational confirmation of 
christian doctrine. It was ~xactly such confirmation which 
Clarke's philosophical writings purported to set forth. 
Butler questioned certain of Clarke's arguments. The corres-
pondence extended over a period of about four years, from 
the latter part of Butler's stay at Tewkesbury Academy, 
/ 
until sometime during his years at Oriel College, Oxford. 
:rt 
It is mainly significant as an early indication of his 
aptitude for care£ul and critical thought. 
While at Tewkesbury, Butler began to question the 
17 
grounds of his Presbyterian nonconformity. His decision on 
this issue was in favor of the established Anglican church. 
The elderly Thomas Butler was distressed at this development 
but could do nothing to change the mind of his son. Conse-
quently, with this change of allegiance, Joseph Butler l·eft 
Tewkesbury Academy and entered Oriel College, Oxford. The 
date usually given for his entry at Oxforq is March 17, 
1 
1714. 
At Oxfordt Butler was discontent with the pedantic 
and uncritical atmosphere which seemed to prevail. In a 
letter to Clarke he wrote 1 11 0ur people here never had any 
doubt in their lives concerning a received opinion. 112 He 
also confided to Clarke that 11 there is very [little] 
encouragement (whether one regards interest or usefulness) 
now-a-days .for anyone to enter that profession 'Ft.he ministr.y], 
1Duncan-Jones thinks that it may have been 1715. 
~Duncan-Jones, Butler 1 s Moral Philosophy,(Baltimore, Md.: 
Penguin Books Inc. , ·l,-'QS2);.:pp.,: .15-16 . 
\ 
2cited by Duncan-Jones, p. 17. 
• 
• 
who has not got a way of commanding his assent to received 
opinions without examination. 111 
18 
On October 11, 1718, Butler received the Bachelor of 
I 
Civil Law (BCL) degree from Oxford University. Later, in 
1733~ he also received the·Doctor of Civil Law (DCL) degree 
from Oxford. 
Butler 1 s relation to John Wesley is of some interest. 
Butler was quiet, conservative, and serenely dependent upon 
rational considerations. Wesley records a conversation 
between himself and Butler. An excerpt will indicate the 
nature of Butlerts sentiments toward religious 11 enthusiasm. 11 
B. IButlerJ Sirr the pretending to extraordinary 
revelations and gifts of the Holy Ghost is a horrid 
thing, a very horrid thing! 
••••••• w •••••••••••••••••••• 
B. I hear toor that many people fall into fits 
in your societi·es, and that you pray over them. 
W. !Wesley} I do so, my Lord, when. any show, by 
strong cries and tearsr that their soul is in deep 
angu~sh~ I frequently pray to God to deliver them 
from it, and our prayer is often heard in that hour. 
B. Very extraordinary indeed!~ Well, Sir, since 
you ask my advice, I will give it to you very freely. 
You have no business here. You are not commissioned 
to preach in this diocese. Therefore I advise you to 
go hence. 2 
I 
Given the contrasting temperaments and enterprises of the 
two men, there is almost an element of humor in the predict-
ability of a negative reaction to Wesley on the part of 
1cited by Messner, p. 2. 2 Butler, Works, II, 435. 
19 
;Butler, as related above. · 
Very little has been recorded specifically about 
Butler's character and personal idiosyncrasies, but it is 
generally related that he was modest and retiring, serenely 
dispassionate and a bit diffident in conversation, co~serv­
ative, a bit melancholy, fond of music, and generous toward 
needy solicitors. Beyond this, however, the main·portrait 
which we have of Butler is "the portrait of his mind111 
which we find in his published works~ 
ii. Ecclesiastical Career 
In 1718, very soon after receiving his degree from 
Oxford, Butler was ·appointed preacher at the fashionable 
Rolls Chapel in London. Samuel Clarke, with whom he had 
earlier carried on correspondence, was one of several 
influential men who recommended Butler for this post. In 
the meantime he had been ordained deacon, and shortly 
thereafter priest, by the ;Bishop of Salisbury. 2 
1 Duncan-Jones, p. 30. 
2According to Duncan-Jones (p. 17) these two 
ordinations (as deacon and as priest) occurred in 1718 
between Butler's graduation and his appointment to the 
Rolls Chapel. Some older biographies indicate an earlier 
date. Lucas Collins (Butler, in Philosophical Classics 
for English Readers, edited by William Knighti Edinburgh: 
Blackwood and Sons, 1881, p. 8) indicates that it must 
have been in the year 1717. Rogers {p. 63) indicates 
that it must have been prior to 1717. 
20 
It was commonplace at that time for Anglican clergy-
men to hold several positions simultaneously. In 1722r 
1 Butler was appointed to the rectory of Haughton, and in 
1725 he was transferred to the rectory of Stanhope. In 1726, 
Butler resigned his position at the Rolls Chapel and retired 
to Stanhoper devoting his time to study and to the duties of 
that parish. 
In 1733 Lord Chancellor Talbot appointed ~utler to 
be his chaplain. In 1736 he was appointed to the prebendary 
of Rochester Cathedral, and also made Clerk of the Closet to 
Queen Caroline. The Queen professed a keen interest in 
philosophy and commanded Butler's nattendance every evening 
. 2 from seven til nJ.ne .. 11 
~e Queen died the following year (1737). Shortly 
prior to her death she implored her husband (George II) to 
remember Butler with a favorable appointment. One month 
after the Queen's death 1 Butler preached before the king by 
special command, 11upon the subject of being bettered by 
1According to Henry Rogers (Henry Rogers, •rButlern 
in New Biographies of Illustrious Men by Thomas Babington 
Macaulay, Henry Rogers 1 Theodore Martin, and others; Boston: 
Whittemore, Niles, and Hall 1 1857 1 p. 63) the appointment 
was made in 1721. 
2 Rogers 1 P• 65. 
q 
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affliction.n His Majesty was greatly moved by this sermon, 
which strengthened his resolve to secure a favorable appoint-
ment for Butler. Accordingly, in 1738, Butler was appointed 
Bishop of Bristol. It was not beyond Butler•s modesty, in 
accepting this appointment, to indicate to Sir ~obert 
Walpole~ the prime minister, (through whom the appointment 
was officially made) that nindeed the bishoprick of Bristol 
is not very suitable either to the condition of my fortune, 
or the circumstances of my preferment; nor, as I should have 
thought, answerable to the recommendation with which I was 
2 honoured.n In 1740, Butler was also appointed to the dean-
ship of St. Paul's, whereupon he resigned from the rectory 
of Stanhope and from the prebendary of Rochester. In 1746, 
Butler was made Clerk of the Closet to George li. The 
following year (1747) he was offered the primacy of England, 
which he declined. 
In 1750, Butler was appointed to the Bishopric·of 
Durham. The circumstances of his appointment to this 
position are significant. The Duke of Newcastle, who made 
the appointment, first sought an agreement ~th Butler that 
1collins, pp. 15-16. Cited by Collins from a 
diary of Dr. Thomas Wilson~ 
2Duncan-Jones, p. 19. 
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he would give a certain prebend of that see to a certain 
Thomas Chapman. This sort of ecclesiastical politics was 
common practice in Butler's day, but he nevertheless refused 
to have any part in it. In a letter to the Duke, Butler 
wrote: 
Your Grace will please to remember that when you 
mentioned this regarding the appointment of Thomas 
Chapman to me near three-quarters of a year agoe, 
I made not a word of answer, but went on talking of 
other things, and upon your repeating the mention of 
it at the same time 1 just as I was going out of your 
Dressing Room, I told your Grace it did not admit of 
an Answer. This my Silence 1 and this my Reply were 
owing to my being in so great a surprise at such a 
thing being asked of me beforehand that I durst not 
trust myself to talk upon the subject. But upon 
settling within myself what I ought to say, I ppoposed 
to wait upon your Grace and let you know that I could 
not take any Church Promotion upon the condition of 
any such Promise Q~ Intimation as your Grace seemed 
to expect. ~ •• My Lord, the Bishops as well as the 
inferior Clergy take the Oaths against Simony and as 
I should think an express Promise of Preferment to a 
Patron beforehand an express Breach of that Oath, and 
would deny ~~stitution upon it, so I should think a 
tacit Promise a tacit Breach of it. 1 
In the end, Butler was elected to the bishopric of 
Durham without any political obligations on his part. The 
spirit in which Butler accepted this appointment is also 
indicated by a letter in which he answered the congratu-
lations of a friend. Here he wrote; ni foresee many 
1Letter by Butler to the Duke of Newcastle. Butler, 
Works, II, 431-432. 
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difficulties in the station I am coming into, and no advant-
age worth thinking of, except some greater power of being 
1 
serviceable to others~ 11 
Butler's relatives did not completely appreciate his 
scruples. As bishop of Durham he declined to give "prefer-
ment 11 to one of his nephews. A brother of the disappointed 
aspirant declared to Butler in exasperation, nMy Lord, it is 
2 
a misfortune to be related to you.'' Butler 1 s family was 
also disappointed at his refusal to accept the primacy of 
I 
England. A nephew had promptly offered to loan Butler 
20,000 pounds, or even more "if his hesitation to accept the 
3 primacy arose from any dread of the first expenses. 11 
Butler died on June 16, 1752, at the age of sixty, 
and was buried in Bristol Cathedral. 
iii. Publications 
(1) The Sermons 
Butler~s first publication was that of fifteen 
sermons. These were a selection from those which he had 
preached at the Rolls Chapel, and were published in 1726 
at about the time of his resignation from that position. 
1Duncan-Jones, p. 24. 2collins, p. 26. 
3rbid., p. 20. 
24 
In 1729 the second edition of these sermons appeared, with 
some corrections and additions, together with a lengthy 
preface. During Butler•s lifetime, a third edition appeared 
in 1736, and a fourth edition in 1749. To the fourth edi-
tion was added "Six Sermons Preached upon Public Occasions.n1 
Later editions also included ••charge to the Clergy of the 
2 
Diocese of Durham" delivered by Butler in 1751. 
It is in the original collection of fifteen sermons 
that Butler(s moral philosophy is largely set forth. More 
specifically, sermons i. ii, iii, v, vi 1 viii, ix, xi, and 
xii, together with the preface are essential to the statement 
\ 
o·f Butler's position. Sermons iv, vii, x, xiii, xiv, and 
xv, together with the dollection of six sermons and the 
charge to the clergy of Durham are of a more practical and 
homiletic nature. 
For the purposes of this study, it is of interest to 
note that Butler's ethical discourses are philosophically 
rather than theologically grounded. .His objective was to 
establish the full integrity of moral experience on inde-
pendent empirical and rational grounds, without appeal to 
1Title in Gladstone edition of Butler's Works. 
2Title in Gladstone edition of Butler's Works. 
theological considerations. As Duncan-Jones states the 
matter, "In his philosophical writings, Butler asks for no 
concessions: as much 'as the most secular philosopher, he 
appeals to common sense, refined by whatever nice qualifi-
1 
cations and rigourous analyses we are able to command. 11 
.In a critical study of Butler, it is thus completely 
appropriate to place these writings in philosophic, rather 
than in theological perspective. 
There is another aspect of Butler's ethical dis-
courses which also tends to identify them with moral 
25 
philosophy as a secular discipline. Today, moral philosophy 
is widely concei ve.d as an attempt to explicate the formal, 
logical, and empirical status of ethical juagment. Moral 
philosophy, thus conceived, is distinct from moral exhorta-
tion. Butler's critical study of ethics is also ~argely 
concerned, not with the specific constituent duties of a 
good life, but with fundamental questions about the nature 
and criteria of moral judgment. 2 He is not so much engaged 
in making specific moral judgments as in indicating the logi-
cal and empirical bases of such judgment in general. 
In the preface to Butler•s fifteen sermons it is 
stated that the selection of these particular ones was 
1 Duncan-Jones, p. 30. 2Ibid .. , p. 9. 
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largely an accidental and random affair. The contemporary 
student of Butler is teased further by the fact that all 
remaining unpublished sermons, together with other papers, 
were destroyed by burning, as had been requested in Butler•s 
will. 
(2) illhe Analogy 
The work upon which Butler•s immediate fame largely 
rested was The Analogy of Religion Natural and Reveaied to 
the Constitution and Course of Nature. This was published 
in 1736 after seven years of quiet semi-retirement at the 
rectory of Stanhope. A small section of the Analogy, known 
as "A Dissertation upon the Nature of Virtuerr2 is highly_ 
relevant to the study of Butler•s moral philosophy. Part I 
of the Analogy, entitled, "Of Natural Religion1r also contains 
some significant passages on this topicw Otherwise, the 
content of the Analogy falls under the heading of Christian 
apologetics. The central contention of the work is.this: 
that there is a fundamental similarity between the structure 
of spiritual and that of natural phenomena. Therefore cele-
brated objections to Christian doctrine are undercut by the 
1 Butler, Works, II, 29. 
2This dissertation ~ppears as an appendix to Part I, 
Chapter iii "Of the Moral Government of God. nr 
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fact that similar objections might also be brought against 
the structure of natural phenomena~ 
Whether or not Butler was himself a deist is a 
matter of definition. Generally, Butler is regarded as an 
opponent of deism, and the Analogy as the chief instrument 
of his attack upon it. Stuart M. Brown, however, states the 
matter thust that 
fundamentally, Butler was himself a Deist: complacent, 
sweetly and abstractly reasonable even in his arguments 
supporting revelation, and utterly secure in what he 
took to be a thoroughly good and rationally ordered uni-
verse. The Analogy is; therefore, much less an attack 
upon Deism from the outside than an effective and sub-
versive reorientation of it from within. • • • He 
IButlerJ was engaged in winning, to a form of Deism 
acceptable to the Anglican community, men'who would 
otherwise have been orthodox Deists. 1 
The Analogy was a monumental work. rt was carefully 
and comprehensively conceived, and written with painstaking 
precision. Within the intellectual context of Butler•s day 
it was highly effective. For nearly 150 years after Butler•s 
death, the Analogy continued to b~ widely appreciated. 2 
Within the past sixty years, however, its decline has been 
rapid, and almost co~plete. 
1
stuart M. Brown, Jr., (ed.), Five Sermons Preached 
at the Rolls Chapel and a Dissertation upon the Nature of 
Virtue by Joseph Butler (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 
1950) , pp. vii-ix. 
2Lavely, p. 187. 
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(3} The Contemporary Reputation of Butler•s Writings 
Horace T. Lavely summarizes the historical impor-
tance of Butler thus~ 
In order to remain permanently a living force in 
human experience, a man'must speak a universal languagei 
he must direct his thought to perennial problems in such 
a way as to break through and transcend the thought 
forms of his own age. This, Butler in large measure 
failed to do. He spoke to his own age 1 in an attempted 
solution of the problems of his own age •••• Students 
of religion will honor him for what he did but will look 
to others for leadership in the pres.ent age .l 
Few people would question the appropriateness of this 
estimate in relation to the Analogy. There may be grounds, 
however, for distinguishing between the Analogy and the 
Sermons in this respect. Professor Stuart Brown writes: 
While the Butler of the Analogy can be appreciated only 
within the context of Deism, this Butler of the Sermons 
had the great merit of speaking plainly, with great 
common sense, upon genuine issues which puzzle reflective 
men of any civilized age.2 
Butler's reputation in the eighteenth and in the 
nineteenth century rested much more largely upon the Analogy 
than upon the Sermonsr though both were widely read~ The 
Analogy represented Butler 1 s magnum opus. The Sermons were 
undoubtedly composed with a great deal of care 1 but one can 
hardly feel that they received the same protracted and 
1Ibid. 1 P• 215 o 2;s . rown, p. l.X. 
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painstaking attention which was given to the Analogy. As we 
have noted, Butler tells us that the selection of particular 
sermons £or publication did not follow from any systematic 
1 
considerations. 
At present a certain amount of attention continues to 
be given to Butler 1 s Sermons. In 1950, five of these sermons 
together with Butler's unissertation upon the Nature of 
Virtue 11 were published by the Liberal Arts Press, and edited 
by Professor Stuart Brown of Cornell University. In 1958 
the original corpus of fifteen sermons was published in 
London by G. Bell and Sons Ltd. Previous editions of the 
Sermons have also appeared in this century. However, the 
last two publications of the Analogy were in 1906. 2 and in 
3 
1900. Though the sermons do not represent a systematically 
elaborated philosophy 1 as does the Analogy, there continue 
to be students who find in them a significant degree of 
penetration into perennial issues of moral philosophyw 
In addition to the Sermons and to the Analogy, 
1 Butler, Works, II, 29. 
2 New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1906. 
3Butler, Works, edited by J. J. Bernard (2 vols.; 
London: Macmillan and Co., 1900) ~ 
.e 
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collections of Butler's works have often included letters 
to Clarke, a few other miscellaneous letters, some prayers, 
and also a sermon of questionable authorship which many 
have attributed to Butler. 
(4) ~utler•s Literary Style 
There are those who find Butler's style of writing 
unduly laborious. For instance, there is the statement by 
Mackintosh that nno thinker so great was ever so bad a 
1 
writer.n Butler himself has a few comments to make on the 
subject of literary style. He advises the reader that each 
subject has its own peculiar degree and type of clarity. 
"nothing can be understood without that degree of attention 
which the very nature of the thing requires.n 2 Not all 
writing can or should be transparently easy to understand; 
but all writing should be free from inherent complexity and 
confusion. 
It is unpardonable for a man to lay his thoughts before 
others, when he is conscious that he himself does not 
knowcwhereabouts he is, or how the matter before him 
stands. It is coming abroad in disorder 1 which he ought 
to be dissatisfied to find himself in at home.3 
1cited by James Seth, English Philosophers and 
Schools of Philosophy (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co. 1 1912), 
p .. 189 .. 
2 Butler 1 Works/ II 1 3. 
3 . Ibid. I p. 4. 
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Butler has not sought to be witty or entertainingi he has 
sought only to elucidate an intrinsically d~ff4cult subject. 
Criticism is warranted, he says, only by those who understand 
the content of his writing and can show how this, rather than 
1 
something else, might have been expressed more clearly. He 
is far from suggesting that his style could not have been 
. d 2 1mprove • In response to possible criticism about it he 
only wishes to make two points: (1) that the subject of 
nmorals 11 is intrinsically difficulti and {2) that he is more 
concerned with the proper ordering of his thoughts than with 
the fluency and ease of his literary style. 
Comments upon ~utler•s style have not always been 
negative. Duncan-Jones comments that it 
is not smooth or easy, but remarkably exact, economical 
and searching •••• ~o my mind Butler's qualifications 
and amplifications, and his flat unadorned diction, 
often have a charm of their own. 3 
And in a similarly complimentary vein 1 Mr. W. H. Hutton 
speaks of the •rmassive splendour 1 11 •rmassive force 1 n and 
4 
nsheer weight" of Butler•s style. 
3
nuncan-Jones, p. 35. 
4cited by Matthews, p~ x. 
'cHAPTER II 
THE NATURE OF MAN 
Butler•s moral philosophy is developed from the con-
viction that there is a definite structure in the human 
psyche. In this chapter we shall seek to delineate that 
structure as it is conceived by Butler, We shall first con-
sider the specific components of human nature: the basic 
propensions1 in section one, and the regulative faculties 
in section two. In section three we shall consider Butler's 
view of human nature from the standpoint of certain general 
ontological questions. 
1, AppetitesJ Affections, and Passions 
Ce~tain basic propensions constitute the building 
blocks o£ human natu~e and experience. Butler refers to 
these as 11Appetites, Affections, and Passions. 11 Most 
commentators assume that 11 appetites, 11 11passions, 11 and 
11 affections 11 are synonymous in Butler's usage, McPherson,. 
however, distinguishes between passions and affections on 
the one hand, and appetites on the other. Passions and 
1Following Norton (Bishop Butler: Moralist and 
Divine; New Brunswick; Rutgers University Press, 1940) we 
use the word 11propensions 11 as the equivalent of "appetites, 
affections, and passions 11 in Butler 1 s terminology. 
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affections, he says, refer to the relatively non-physical 
dr.±ves such as desire of esteem, indignation, filial love, 
ambition, and pity, while 11 appetites '1 have reference to a 
more definitely physical category of impulses, such as 
1 hungerw Many passages in Butler•s work tend to corrobor-
ate this distinction, but obvious exceptions are also 
2 
extremely frequent. McPherson seems to have overstated the 
case in purporting to find uniform consistency in Butlerrs 
usage of these particular terms. The category of impulses 
under discussion in particular passages of Butlerts work can 
only be discerned from the context~ 
We shall now consider the principal points in 
Butlerts discussion of human appetites, passions, and 
affections. 
i~ The Irreducibility of Benevolence · 
Butler uses the word ''benevolence 11 in a very broad 
sense. It encompasses the total range of desire for 
another•s welfare. ncornpassiontt is a less inclusive term 
and is an aspect o£ benevolence. The specific object of 
compassion is the relief of suffering. Thus Butler speaks 
l!J:'homas H •. McPherson, "'The Development of Bishop 
Butler's Ethics, Part It" Philosophy 1 23 (1948); 321. 
2~utler, Works, II, pp. 24 1 25 1 99, 193, 194, et. 
passim. 
of nthe exercise of char~ty and benevolence in the way of 
. 1 
compass1.on or mercy,n and of nthe course of benevolence 
which compassion marks out and directs us to.n2 
In asserting the re~lity of benevolence, Butler is 
clear and f~rceful in his appeal to experience against all 
theories which would distort it. He writes: 
If there be in mankind any disposition to friendship; 
if there be any such thing as compassion, for compas-
sion is momentary love; if there be any such thing as 
the paternal or filial aff~ctions; if there be any 
affection in human nature, the object and end of which 
is the good of another; this is itself benevolence, or 
the love of another.3 
In a footnote, Butler also asserts this-appeal to 
the facts .. 
If any person can in earnest doubt, whether there 
be such thing as good-will in one man towards another; 
••• let it be observed, that whether man be thus 1 or 
otherwise.constituted, what is the inward frame in 
this particular, is a mere question of £act or natural 
history 1 not provable immediately by reason.4 
According to Butler, the trouble with Hobbes was 
34 
that nthis learned person had a general hypothesis to which 
the appearance of good-will could not otherwise be reconciled. 115 
1Ibid. 1 pe. 115 • 3Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
4Ibid., p. 37n. 5 Ibid., p. 36n. 
Elsewhere, in the same vein, Butler writes: •rHere is a 
plain matter of fact, which men cannot reconcile with the 
general account they think fit to give of things: they 
therefore 1 instead o£ that manifest fact, substitute 
another which is reconcilable to their own scheme."1 An 
ordinary man would not fall into such an error. Only a 
person of superior intelligence would thus propound a 
2 
theory, and then coerce the facts to fit that theory. 
35 
"The proper advice to be given to plain honest men • is 
that of the son of Sirach: In every good work trust thy1 • 
own soul, £or this is the keeping o£ the commandment.n3 
Butler•s position is clear. There are certain 
irreducible facts o£ experience which cannot be legitimately 
denied. Benevolence as a primary drive, is one such fact. 
In our discussion of disinterestedness we shall have 
occasion to consider more specifically the nature of 
benevolence, and its relation to the other basic propensions. 
(1) Classification of the Affections 
An action may be analyzed from several standpoints. 
From one standpoint it is abstracted from the acting agent 
6Ibid., p. 106. 
3Ibid., p. 107; Butler cites Ecclesiasticus 22:23. 
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and regarded in a formal sense~ From anot~er standpoint, the 
act is analyzed in terms of the personal, psychic phenomena 
from which it springs. In Butler 1 s ethical discourses human 
actions are analyzed from each of these standpoints, though 
the distinction between them is only implicit. 
From the formal standpoint (that of the act itself, 
abstracted from the actor) Butler distinguishes between 
actions which primarily promote public good, and those which 
1 
primarily promote private good. Throughout the sermons 
there is also a classification of human actions under the 
headings of self-love and benevolence. Butler observes, 
almost with surpriset that these two types of classification 
do not exactly correspond. The category of action which pro-
motes public good corresponds generally to the category of 
benevolent impulses, and the category of action which pro-
motes private good corresponds generally to the impulses of 
self-lovei but there are exceptions to this general corres-
pondence. For instance, there are some affections, such as 
"desire of esteem from others"2 which entail pi"omotion of 
public good, and yet are identified with concern for our-
selves rather than with concern for other people. 
1Ibid., pp. 12, 35-41, et,~ passim. 
2Ibid., p. 40, et. passim. 
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That these two systems of classification are not 
quite parallel follows from the fact that in one of them~ 
distinctions are made from the standpoint of ~he act, while 
in the other distinctions are drawn from the standpoint of 
the actor. Unfortunately, Butler does not articulate very 
explicitly the distinction in perspective between these two 
schemes of classification, and the reader is often left in 
some confusion as to the exact relationship between 
benevolence, public affection, self-love, and private 
affection. 
That private affections tend to promote private 
interest while public affections tend to promote public 
interest does not impress Butler as being very essential to 
the question of interestedness and disinterestedness. The 
reason for this irrelevancy is the fact that this classifi-
cation pertains only to the. act, and not to the actor. On 
the other hand~ the subject of self~love and benevolence 
entails a psychological analysis of the human actor. Such 
an analysis leads us very quickly into the essentials of 
Butlerts moral philosophyw 
(2) The Princ~ple of Interestedness 
We come now, more particularly, to Butler 1 s analysis 
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of action from the standpoint of the motivated actor. We 
note first that the concept of disinterestedness is 
sharpened and qualified by recognition of fundamental 
respects in which all actions are equally interested as well 
as equally disinterested. Here it is recognized that the 
self is inevitably the locus of desire as well as the locus 
of satisfaction arising from its fulfilment. For indeed, 
uno one can act but from a desire, or choice, or preference 
of his own. 111 This is equally true whether the action 
springs from self-love or whether it springs from benevolence. 
11Every particular affection, even the love of our neighbor, 
1 is as really our own affection as self-love.n Likewise 
gratification in.each case is one's own gratification. Thus • 
•rbenevolence is no more disinterested than any of the common 
particular passions~" 3 
And if, because every particular affection is a manjs 
own, and the pleasure arising from its gratification 
his own pleasure, or pleasure to himself, such parti-
cular affection must be called self-love; according 
to this way of speaking, no creature whatever can 
possibly act but merely from self-love; and every 
action and every affection whatever is to be resolved 
up into this one principle. 4 
libid., p. 22. 
4rbid. , p. 188. 
3 Ibid. I p. 24. 
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Duncan-Jones observes that upon any reasonable concept 
of an act, "the generalization that all my actions ppring 
from my desires or motives proves to be a disguised tauto~-
11 ogy-;~" That all acts are in this important sense interested 
helps to undermine the idea that considerations of interested-
ness or disinterestedness can enter into the criterion of 
moral tight. 
The goodness or badness of actions does not arise from 
hence, that the epithet interested or disinterested may 
be applied to them; • • • but from their being what 
they are; namely, what becomes such creatures as we 
are. 2 
(3) The External Orientation of Desire 
Butler finds that the primary propensions are essen-
tially disinterested. We must now seek to discover more 
precisely what is entailed by this idea of disinterestedness. 
A careful reading of sermon xi seems to indicate that there 
are two aspects to this concept in ~utler's system~ The dis-
tinction between these aspects is implicit rather than 
explicit. Generally, it seems that interpreters have been 
in the habit of accepting and discussing one of these as 
Butler's real meaningr to the exclusion of the other. 
lnuncan-Jones, p. 97. 2 Butler, Works, II, 25. 
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Exegetically, however 1 it is difficult to deny either of 
these aspects as an essential part of Butler's meaning. 
At the outset, we might note, with regard to the 
idea of disinterestedness as a whole that Butler's 
insistence is upon the complete isolation of self-love and 
the primary propensions as disti~ct principles of moti~~ 
~ation, though in actual embodiment they may become 
inextricably combined. 
Self-love and any particular passion may be joined 
togetheri and from this complication, it becomes 
impossible in numberless instances to determine pre-
cisely; how far an action, parhaps even of one 1 s own, 
has for its principle general self-love, or some 
particular passion. But this need create no confusion 
in the ideas themselves of sel£-love and particular 
passions.l 
The first, and most difficult aspect of Butlerian 
disinterestedness is brought to our attention in the state-
ment that.uall particular appetites and passions are towards 
external things themselves, distinct from the pleasure 
arising from them. 112 In contrast to this, the object of 
self-love "is somewhat internal, our own happiness, enjoy-
3 
ment, satisfaction ... 
1
rbid. t P• 22f • 2 Ibid., p .. 18.7. 3rug. 
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These statements raise the issue of whether man is 
or can be motivated by anything other than a conscious state 
of himself. Bu~ler seems to assert that fundamentally, 
desire is not directed toward the conscious state of oneself 
which will result from its fulfilment. One is first 
attracted toward an objective, and it is only because of 
this fundamental attraction that the attainment of that 
objective brings pleasure. 
There coul~ not be this pleasure, were it not for the 
prior suitableness between the object and the passion: 
there could be no enjoyment or delight from one thing 
more than another, from eating food more than from 
swallowing a stone, if there were not an affection or 
appetite to one thing more than another.l 
Furthermore, the direct pursuit of pleasure is one which 
inevitably undercuts itself. nif self-love wholly engrosses 
us, and leaves no room for any other principle, there can 
be absolutely no such thing at all as happiness, or enjoy-
ment of any kind whatever. Disengagement is absolutely 
. 2 
necessary to en]oyment. 10 
The discussion thus far raises certain crucial prob-
lems~ For instance, how aan one be motivated by anything 
1Ibid. I Cf • PP • 19'0 1 192 1 193 • 
2' Ibid~, pp. 190, 191. 
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other than a subjective state of himself? What lure can a 
given objective possibly have other than that of its effect 
upon my own subjective state? These questions are indeed 
perplexing. On the other hand, ordinary experience does 
seem to corroborate Butleris point~ We know that if we are 
preoccupied with the attainment of a certain subjective 
stater the result will indeed be frustrating. Subjective 
states can only emerge from preoccupation with something 
other than themselves. Butler's introspective account of 
the matter is thus confirmed by our.own. 
The contemporary reader will still feel that Butlerts 
account of the matter is vastly oversimplified. Duncan-
Jones observes that '~tButler does not take much notice of the 
variety of relations in which the object of a passion might 
1 
stand to the subject of it.,n Professor Pepper suggests 
that though Butlerls account is an oversimplification by 
t~day•s standards, it yet represented a highly discerning 
piece of analysis, and was all the more remarkable for the 
fact that he did not have 11much more to go on than the 
2 psychology of Hobbes and Locke for a background.u 
1 Duncan-Jones, p. 49. 
2stephen c. Pepper, Ethics (New York: Appleton-
Century Crofts, Inc., 1960), p. SOn. 
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Essentially, we agree with Butler that there is 
indeed a very fundamental sense in which man 1 s bas.ic pro-
pensions do not aim at the attainment of pleasure or of 
any other subjective state. At the same time we should 
note that the issue contains certain unresolved perplexi-
ties and that Butler's sweeping assertions leave a great 
deal of careful introspective and logical analysis yet to 
be done. 
There is ~aso another aspect to Butler's contrast 
betwe~n the disinterestedness of the particular propensions~ 
and the interestedness of self-love. C. D. Broad writes 
that for Butler, the word disinterested means., nnot done 
with the motive of maximizing onets own happiness in the 
long run. 111 ·The distincti~n here is between the desire of 
a particular propension~ and the desire for one•s total~ 
inclusive·well-being. To the extent that we love ourselves 
we will consciously seek to maximize our total well-being. 
As to the particular propensions I however r ,. it is not 
because we love ourselves that we find delight in such and 
such objects, but because we have particular affections 
2 
towards them. 11 To support this distinction, Butler makes 
1 Broad, p. 55 .. 2 Butler,.Works, II, 23. 
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repeated references to the fact that fulfilment of a parti-
cular, irresistible desire may be contrary to our known 
. 1 . 1 1nterests, and may even ead us to ru1n. A man may rorush 
upon certain ruinJr either for rrthe destruction of an enemyu 
or for "the preservation of a friend.n 2 Any given propen-
sion may then conflict with our long range interests. It 
is in this sense that they are all fundamentally disinter-
ested. 
We have noted two senses in which the idea of dis-
interestedness appears in Butler 1 s thoughtw Most interpre-
ters seize upon one or the other of these as Butler1s real 
meaning. puncan-Jones interprets Butler in terms of the 
. . . 3 first but regards the 1dea as m1staken. Bernard also 
interprets Butler in this way but finds the idea to be 
penetratingly correct. 4 Stephen C. Pepper finds this idea 
of disinterestedness to be an essenti.ally correct, though 
5 
oversimplified account of basic human desire. On the 
other .hand, C. ·n. Broad tells us that Butler has nh:bs o-yvn 
6 
sense of the word ldisinterested,• and that in this sense 
1Ibid.', ppw 194, 203,. et. passim. 2 . Ib1d., p. 194. 
3nuncan-Jones, pp. 48-50; 98. 
4J. H. Bernard; (ed.) The Works of Bishop Butler 
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1900), I, 153. 
5pepper, pp. 79-80. 6Broad,. p. 55. 
it means, as we have noted, 11not done with'the motive of 
maximizing one-s own happiness in the long run. 111 
Our own point of view is that it is exegetically 
impossible to e~a§e cofuplete~y. either of these two senses 
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of the word 11disinterested11 as Butler uses it. We might 
note~ however, that there are only a few key passages which 
force the first interpretation upon us, while the second one 
is that which·predominates in Butler 1 s usage. We might also 
observe that interpreters have generally paid more attention 
to the first than to the second of these meanings. There are 
also many secondary works which do not stop for a careful-
analysis of the matter at all. 
In retrospect now upon our total disqussion of dis-
interestedness we may note that Butler has undercut the bias 
against social and benevolent concerns by showing that this 
as well as all of human action springs from the drive for 
fulfilment of manks various propensions. Thus, there is no 
need for ridicule of benevolent desire; for-it too is 
respectably "interested.... At the same time, there is a 
fundamental sense in which all desires are also equally dis-
interested. nWhatever ridicule therefore the mention of a 
disinterested principle or action may be supposed to lie 
-
open to, must, upon the matter being thus stated, relate 
to ambition, and every appetite and particular affection, 
1 
as much as to·benevolence. 11 
iii. The Status of Resentment 
That human nature includes the affections of com-
passion and benevolence is a proof for Eutler of the fact 
that man is designed to ,promote the welfare of others as 
well as of himself. At this point the empirical method 
calls for recognition also of some hostility, and of some 
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anti-social impulses in human nature. Does it follow from 
the activity of such impulses that man is designed in some 
degree to inflict harm upon others? This is the conclusion 
to which the trend of Butler 1 s thought might seem to be 
leading. Obviously, he does not wish to draw such a con-
elusion. 
The meaning and status of resentment in human nature 
is considered in sermon viiit "Upon Resentment 11 and in sermon 
ix, "Upon Forgiveness of Injuries."' After several paragraphs 
of introduction in sermon viii, the exposition itself begins 
1 Butler 1 Works 1 II 1 196; cf. p. 24. 
with these words: nTherefore, since no passion God hath 
1 
endued us with can be in itself evil tr This passage 
immediately betrays the fact that Butler is not free from 
presuppositions on the subject. However this may be, we 
shall conclude in the end that Butleris account of the 
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matter has considerable merit on its own grounds, apart from 
whatever theological presuppositions may have also been 
involved .. 
Butler distinguishes between two kinds of res~ntment. 
The first of these is sudden and instinctive. 11The reason 
and end, for which man was made thus liable to this passion, 
is, that he might be better qualified to preventt and like-
wise (or perhaps chiefly) to resist and defeat, sudden 
force, violence, and opposition, considered merely as such, 
and without regard to the fault or demerit of them. 112 The 
. 3 
second kind of resentment is 11 Settled and del~berate. 11 
Both of these have as their objective the realization and 
preservation of moral order in the individual and in society. 
With particular reference to 11 settled and de1iberatett 
resentment Butler writes: 
1Ibid. t P • 138 • 2Ibid. I p. 140. 3Ibid .. , p. 1"38. 
As God Almighty forsaw the irregularities and 
disorders, both natural and moral, which would 
happen in this state of things; he hath graciously 
made some provision against them. • • • It is 
necessary for the very subsistence of the world, that 
injury, injustice, and cruelty should be punished; 
and since compassion, which is so natural to mankind, 
would render that execution of justice exceedingly 
difficult and uneasy; indignation against vice and 
wickedness is, and may be allowed to be a balance to 
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that weakness of pity, and also to anything else 1 
which would prevent the necessary methods of severity~ 
Resentment against evil is an aspect of manrs moral 
sensibilities. 
It seems in us plainly connected with a sense of 
virtue and vice, o£ moral good and evil. • • • The 
indignation raised by cruelty and injustice, and the 
desire of having it punished, which persons uncon-
cerned would feel, is by no means malice. No, it is 
resentment against vice and wickedness: it is one of 
the common bonds, by which society is held together; 
a fellow-feeling; which each individual has in behalf 
of the whole species, as well as of himself. And it 
does not appear that this, generally speaking, is at 
all too high amongst mankind~2 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . 
That passion 1 from whence men take occasion to run 
into the dreadful vices of malice and revenge; even 
that passion, as implanted in our nature by God, is 
not only innocent, but a generous movement of mind. 
It is in itself, and in its original, no more than 
indignation against injury and wickedness. 3 
Furthermore, this feeling of moral indignation is a universal 
witness "concerning the reality of virtue, and whether it be 
1 Ibid., pp. 146-147. 
3Ibid., p. 149. 
2Ibid., p. 141. 
1 
found in the nature of things. 11 
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Resentment is categorized as a "secondary passion."2 
The other passions may be innocently gratified as ends in 
themselves, even when they are not subservient to any more 
remote goal. The gratification of resentment, however, can 
never be an end in itself since it produces a ~egree of 
misery in order to prevent greater evil. Also, on the part 
of the agent, the fulfilment of this passion is a release 
from unhappiness rather than any positive satisfaction. 3 
Resentment, though a secondary passion, is not in 
itself an evil. In fact, it is 11plainly connected with a 
sense of virtue and viceu4 and thus potentially a part of 
man•s moral self-realization. It is, however, like all 
other passions, subject to distortion·. nMen frequently 
indulge a passion in such ways and degrees that at length 
it becomes quite another thing from what it was originally 
5 in our na:ture. 11 • In strong natures, resentment may take the 
unnatural form of uncontrollable passion. In weaker natures 
. b . h 6 ~t may ecome peev~s ness. Settled resentment may become 
distorted through various forms of exaggeration. 7 
libid. 1 P~ 148, 2Ibid. I P~ 155. 3Ibid. f p. 73. 
4Ibid., p"' 141.. 5 Ibid., p"' 138. 6Ibid. I PP~ 144-145 •. 
7Ibidoq pp. 145-146. 
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Butler tells us that a proper degree of resentment 
' 
may coexist with natural benevolence toward the same person. 
The two often coexist in the attitude of parents toward their 
children. Also t •rwe may . . . love our enemy, and yet have 
resentment against him for his injurious behaviour towards 
1 
us. ~r One must bear in mind the admixture of good and evil 
which there is in human nature and thus resist the tendency 
to regard one who has offended us as "monstrous, without 
anythi:g.g right or human in him." 2 The intermingling of good 
and evil in the character of one who has wronged us should 
elicit on our part a judicious degree of both resentment 
and benevolence.. Benevolence is :.also elicited by this con-
sideration: 
No one ever did a designed injury to another 1 but at 
the same time he did a much greater to himself. If 
therefore we would consider things justly1 such an 
one isf according to the natural course of our affec-
tions, an object of compassion 1 as well as of dis-
pleasure: and to be affected really in this manner 
• argues the true greatness of mind.3 
A judicious degree of resen~ment is thus not incom-
patible with the biblical injunction to love onets en~mies. 
Malice and revenge, however, are distortions of resentment. 
1Ibid. 1 P• 158. 2Ibid., p. 163. 3 Ibid., p. 165. 
\ 
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,, 
These occur when resentment is not held in a proper balance 
1 
with benevolence~ 
We might note that Butleris account of resentment is 
in some respects reminisc~nt of an Aristotelian ideal: the 
good man wi~l be angry at the right time, with the right 
person, and for the proper length of time. 2 Unlike 
Aristotle1 however, Butler conveys the impression of being 
slightly emRarrassed about the entire subject, 
In his account of resentment Butler writes that it 
may be indulged in such a way "that at length it becomes 
quite another thing from what it was originally in our 
nature. 113 From his further exposition it is clear that he 
does not mean that a particular primary impulse changes in 
its fundamental nature. What he does mean is that·conse-
quent behaviour is distorted through the fact that this 
t 
passion fails to be balanced by the exercise of other 
principle in one•s nature. 
Butler•s analysis of resentment has the merit of 
indicating for us a fundamental distinction to be drawn 
between several types of socially negative feeling and action. 
libid._,. P• 158.-
2Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1109b, 15. 
3Butler, Works, II, 138. 
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Proper resentment follows from a state o£ psychic ordered-
ness. It is a defense mechanism with which nature has 
endowed man for the preservation of himself and of society. 
Howevert revenge, hatred, and direct ill will are not normal 
aspects of man's nature. These follow from a state of 
psychic disorder. and imbalance. 
Though Butler does not articulate this point, we 
should note that the imbalance, from which follows direct 
ill will and revenge, is often, if not always, occasioned by 
situations in which man is threatened and frustrated. This 
is one of several possible reactions to such situations. 
The idea which we are here attempting to express is 
also suggested by Brand Blanshard. 
It may be said that there are impulses in human 
nature whose indulgence is evil, such as those of 
aggression and fear. But Professor Pepper has shown 
fine insight, I think 1 in pointing out that these are 
not drives with ends of their own; they are summoned 
up when other drives are frustrated, and are nature 1 s 
means of intensifying these or safeguarding them.l 
In the same connection 1 G. W. Allport writes: 
Unless one first loves, one cannot h~te 1 for hatred 
is an emotion of protest directed always toward real or 
1Brand Blanshard, 'rThe Impasse in Ethics -- And a Way 
Out," The Philosophical Forum, 17 (1959-60), p. 22. 
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imagined obstructions that prevent one from reachi~g 
objectives ~hat are positively valued, ie. 1 loved. 
Thus Butler tells us that man does not have in his 
nature any basic propension toward evil. 2 Crimes such as 
murder and robbery take their rise from desires which are 
in themselves innocent. 3 Man is fallen insofar as he is dis-
ordered. In Aristotelian language 1 it is a matter of form 
rather than of content which is amiss in human nature. 
2. The Regulative Faculties 
The particular propensions are simply drives toward 
their own £ulfilment. Man shares this level of phenomena 
~ 
with all other conscious beings. An aspect of experience 
which is distinctively human is that of self conscious re-
flection upon actions, and upon their more remote consequences. 
This reflection shows that some actions tend toward public 
good 1 and that others tend toward private good. With this 
awareness there can be coordination of the particular pro-
pensions for maximum benefit to self and to society. With 
this coordination there comes wholeness. An animal is 
1 . G. W. Allport, "A Psychological Approach to the 
Study of Love and Hate,'' chapter 5 in Explorations in 
Altruistic Love and Behaviour, edited by Pitrim A. Sorokino 
($oston: The Beacon Press, 195~,. p. 152. 
, 
2Butler, Works, I,· 77, 78, 124i II, 164, 173, et. 
passim. 
3Ibid., I 1 173 .. 
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dominated by the relative strength of its various impulses. 
In man, mere strength of momentary desire is supplanted by 
the synthesizing operation of the several regulative facul-
ties. These consist of self-love, benevolence, and 
conscience. 
i. Self-Loye 
Butler's age was one in which men professed attrac-
tion to the ideal of egoism. In this context it was neces-
sary to establish that the gratification of desire does not 
necessarily represent fidelity to this ideal. Under the 
heading of self-love, Butler then proceeds to outline the 
principle of true egoism. 
There are two kinds of self-love: supposed self-
1 
love and cool self-love. Supposed self-love is isimply the 
unthinking, spontaneous gratification of desire, which may or 
may not happen to coincide with our inclusive and long 
range interests. Cool self-love is appropriately expressed 
only by a balanced regulation of ~hese desires. As Professor 
Horace T. Lavely notes 1 u•I want what I want when I want itl 
is not an expression of what Butler meant by self-love.n2 
1Ibid. 1 +=!;•,r 22 r 161 r 250 • 2 Lavely, p. 90 .. 
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Self-love is an affective as well as a rational 
principle. 11It is an affection to ourselves; a regard to 
our own interest~ happiness/ and private goodi and in the 
proportion a man hath this, he is interested 1 or a lover of 
1 
himself. •~ Even considered as an affective principle alone, 
it is a distinguishing characteristic of rational beings; 
for only such "can reflect upon themselves and their own 
interest or happiness, so as to have that interest an 
object to their minds. 112 In other terminology (not Butler•s) 
we might refer to this as the phenomenon of self-conscious-
ness. An animal has consciousness and has desire for 
particular objects. Mankind shares this level of experience 
with the animal world, but has additionally, the power of 
self-consciousness 1 or self-transcendence in thought, 
' 
through which, not only particular objects (pleasures), but 
his own general well-being can be an object of desire. 
Manis well-being cannot be achieved through pr~occu-
pation with that objecti~e alone. It is achieved rather 
through •tthe enjoyment of those objects, which are by nature 
suited to our several particular appetites, passions, and 
1 Butler, Works, II 1 189. 
2Ibid. I p. 187. 
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1 
af:feetions .•t Self-love, then, must have something ''to 
2 
employ itself about. 11 That about which it employs itself 
is the fulfilment of the primary desires. Specifically, its 
task is that of integrating and ordering the fulfilment of 
these desires. It is in the carrying out of this task that 
we see self-love as a rational principle. 
The principle of true egoism demands that all of 
manJs impulses find their proper fulfilment. These include 
both the private and the public affections. 11The greatest 
satisfactions to ourselves depend upon our having benevolence 
3 
in a due degree." 
Now there have been persons in all ages, who have 
professed that they found satisfaction in the exercise 
of charityi in the love of their neighbor, in endeavor-
ing to promote the happiness of all they had to do with,
4 and in the pursuit of what is just, and right, and good. 
In another passage Butler asks, 
The 
Does the benevolent man appear less easy with himself, 
from his love to his neighbor? Does he less relish 
his being? Is their any peculiar gloom seated on his 
face? Is his mind less o~en to entertainment, to any 
particular gratification? 
answer is, of course, that 11being in good humour . . . 
itself the temper of satisfaction and enjoyment. rt6 
1Ibid. t p. 190. 2Ibid. I p. 187. 3Ibid. r p. 38. 
4Ibid., p. 199. 5Ibid. I p. 198. 6Ibid .. 
is 
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This line of thought points toward the heart of 
Butler•s moral philosophy. There is no authentic happiness 
apart from self fulfilment at a deep level. Benevolent 
impulses are among the affections whose fulfilment brings 
pleasure, and whose ordered fulfilment brings happiness. 
ii. Benevolence 
Interpreters of Butler are divided as to whether 
benevolence should be regarded as a particular passion or as 
a regulative faculty. G~ D. Broad holds that benevolence in 
Butler's system is primarily a regulative faculty, though in 
sermon i he speaks of it 11as if it were simply one of the 
1 impulses~ 11 On the other hand, Professor Horace T~ Lavely 
holds thatiin the first three sermons benevolence is classi-
fied as a principle co-ordinate with self-love, and that this 
is its primary meaning though elsewhere it is sometimes 
inconsistently treated as a particular affection. 2 McPherson 
tells us that benevolence is quite definitely regarded by 
. . 3 ~utler as a part~cular affect~on~ 
A study of the relevant passages indicates that 
Butler uses the word in both these senses. In a number of 
passages Butler classes benevolence with the particular 
lBroad, p. 56. 2Lavely, pp. 91, 92, 221. 
3McPherson, p. 332. 
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passions in order to indicate that all alike are "disinter-
ested. 11 Thus he writes: 
Benevolence is not in any respect more at variance 
with self-love, than any other particular affection 
whatever.l 
Thus i t::.appears that there is no peculiar contra-
riety between self-love and benevolence; no greater 
competition between these, than between any other 
particular affection and self-love. 2 
. .. . ... . . . . .. . .. .. . . . . . . . . 
All particular affections whatever, resentment, 
benevolence, love of arts, equally lead to a course 
of action for their own gratification.3 
Other passages also might be cited4 but these will suffice to 
indicate this particular usage. 
There are also passages in which it seems equally 
clear that benevolence is a principle co-ordinate with self-
love, in which the total good of another person is consciously 
held as an objective. 
In sermon v Butler writes: 
The private interest of the individual would not be 
sufficiently provided for by reasonable and cool self-
love alone; therefore the appetites and passions are 
placed within as a guard and further security •••• 
Is it possible any can in earnest think, that a public 
spirit, i.e. a settled reasonable principle of benevol-
ence to mankind, is so prevalent and strong in the 
species, as that we may venture to throw off the under 
1Butler, Works, II, 196. 
4IbidL, PP• 198, 201, 423. 
2Ibid., p. 197. 3Ibid. 
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affections, which are its assistants, carry it forward 
and mark out particular courses for it; family, friends, 
neighborhood, the distressed 1 our country;l 
The following passage also articulates this aspect of 
benevolence: 
The charity here meant must be such hearty love to our 
fellow-creatures, as produceth a settled endeavor to 
promote, according to the best of our judgment, their 
real lasting good, both_present and future; ••• Nor 
is it to be supposed, that we can any more promote the 
lasting good to our fellow-creatures, by acting from 
mere kind inclinations, without considering what are the 
proper means of promoting it~ than that we can attain 
our own personal good, by a thoughtless pursuit of every 
thing which pleases us. For the love of our neighbor, 
as much as self-love, the social affections, as much as 
the private onesi from.their very nature, require to be 
under the direction of our judgment.2 
In sermon xii we read: "Thus when benevolence is 
said to be the sum of virtue, it iP not spoken of as a blind 
3 
propension, but as a principle in reasonable creatures. 11 
In this passage Butler indicates the fact that there are 
several alternative senses in which one might regard the 
idea of benevolence. 
In a fragment of Butler 1 s writing which is included 
by Gladstone in the appendix to Vol. I, there is also a dis-
tinction drawn between several types of benevolence~ 
1Ibid., p. 103. 2 Ibid~, P~ 377. 
3Ibid., p. 23; cf. pp. 36n, 209, 210. 
Here commenting upon the Hobbesian interpretation of 
benevolence as the love of power, Butler writes: 
The real benevolence of men is, I think for the 
most part, not indeed the single Love of Power, but 
the Love of Power to be exercised in the way of 
doing good, which is a different thing from Love of 
Good or Happiness of others by whomsoever effected, 1 
which last I would call single or simple Benevolence. 
Here Butler distinguishes between benevolence as a propen-
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sion which seeks expression, and benevolence as a conscious 
regard for another's welfare. 
From this survey of Butler 1·s usage we conclude that 
sometlimes he speaks of benevolence as one of the particular 
affections, while at other times he definitely speaks of it 
as a regulative faculty. In this latter sense i~ is an 
instance of the propensity of a rational being conscious1y- t.9 
articulate and pursue certain objectives. It is an intelli-
gently ordered concern for the welfare of other people, co-
ordinate with self-love as an intelligently ordered concern 
for the welfare of oneself. 
On the level of interest, or of their respective 
objectives, the relationship between benevolence and self-
love might be called symmetrical. On the level of function, 
1
Ibid./ p. 423. 
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however, the relationship is not completely symmetrical. 
There is a sense in which the two are correlated, or kept 
in balance by the latter.· The pursuit of personal well-
being through the ordered fulfilment of oners nature in 
relation to appropriate "objects 11 entails a due proportion 
throughout the total range of desire and activity. Thus the 
outworking of self-love involves a proper co-ordination of 
this faculty with that of rationally ordered benevolence~ 
iii. Conscience 
Conscience is the supreme regulative principle. 
"The ideal human nature( then, consists of particular 
impulses duly subordinated to self-love and benevolence, and 
of these general principles subordinated in turn to the 
, ' 1 , nl supreme pr2nc2p e of consc2ence. Lefevre refers to 
conscience,. in Butler's sense, as uthe synthetic principle 
of the human organism. "2 The destiny of man is to achieve 
integration, or wholeness, according to the pattern implicit 
in his real nature. Conscience is the "guide of lifen to 
lead us tbathatcend. 
:t 
·Broad,. p. 50. 
2Albert Lefevre, "The Significance of Butler•s View 
of Human Nature, 15 Philosophical Review, 8 (1899), 134. 
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The role of conscience is two-fold.. "Conscience 
does not only offer itself to show u~ the way we should 
walk in r but it likewise carries its own authority with it. "l 
!t includes 11the discernment of what is right, 112 together 
with "a disposition to regulate ourselves by it.u3 It is a 
nreflex approbation1' 4 of which nauthori ty and obligation rr5 
is a constituent part. 
Butler repeatedly asserts the supreme authority of 
conscience. The essence of this authority is not that of 
coercive power. 
The principle of reflection or conscience being compared 
with the various appetites 1 passions 1 and affections in 
men, the former is manifestly superior and chief, with-
out regard to strength. And how often soever the latter 
happens to prevail it is mere usurpation: Th~ former 
remains in nature and in kind its superiori ••• 
All this is no more than the distinction which every 
body is acquainted with, between mere power and_author-
ity. 
Butler. sees a close analogy between the authority of 
6 
conscience and that of civil government. It is abundantly 
clear that the latter would be regarded by Butler (in 
' 
contemporary theological terminology) as an order of creation. 7 
1Butler, Works, II, 71. 2Ibid. I p. 214. 3Ibid. 
4Ibid., p. 16. 5 Ibid. 6Ibid. I pp. 64, 67, 68. 
7Ibid. I pp. 362-363. 
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It is not a mere human convention. Conscience then, as well 
as civil government, has an authority wh~ch is rooted in the 
very nature of things. In each case, the fact of this author-
ity is~rior to, and independent of any powers of enforce-
ment which there may be. 
The faculty of conscience was placed within us to be 
1 
our governor. 
This is its right and office: thus sacred is its 
authority. And how often soever men violate and 
rebelliously refuse tq submit to it • • • this makes 
not alteration as to the natural right and office of 
conscience.2 
With a rare rhetorical flourish, Butler declares of conscience 
that "had it strength, as it has right~ had it power, as it 
has manifest authority~ it would absolutely govern the 
3 
world." 
Notwithstanding the frequent occurrence of passages 
such as those cited above, the reader is still left with 
some question as to exactly what it is which does constitute 
the authority of conscience, and as to how this authority is 
so unmistakably discerned. We shall consider these questions 
further in later sections~ particularly in Chapter IV on 
rvThe Nature of Moral Discernment ... 
1Ibid. 1 P• 64. 2 . Ibl.d. I p. 64-65. 3Ibid. I p. 64. 
Sj.l 
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A much discussed question of interpretation concerns 
the relation of conscience to the activity of self-love. 
Butler tells us that self-love is a much better guide than 
passion, but that nit is indeed by no means the religious or 
even moral institution of life.n1 The £act that man is 
•rcapable of happiness or miseryn2 constitutes an •~obligation 
to goo.d will n 3 prior to the same obligation arising from the 
fact that he is a moral agent. F~om these and other passages 
it is evident that a clear distinction is intended. 
The nature of Butler's distinction seems to emerge 
from this observation. When self-love is con.trasted with the 
particular propensions, it is distinguished by cognizance of 
acts .as consonant or not consonant with the long range advant-
age or interest of the agent~ When conscience is contrasted 
with the particular propensions, it seems to be distinguished 
by cognizance of acts as consonant or not consonant with 
man's nature. 4 Thus 1 Butler explains 1 a parent has natural 
affection toward his children. These lead him to certain 
actions. Conscience adds the further reflection that these 
actions constitute n;his proper business, 115 and that which 
l~belongs to him. n 6 
libid. t p. 27. 2Ibid. I p. 159. 
4Ibid., pp. 60-61. 5Ibid. I p. 42. 
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We have seen that benevolence (in the fullest sense, 
as a rationally ordered concern} and self-love are coordin-
ated, or kept in a certain balance by the activity of the 
latter. Now, in considering the highest regulative faculty, 
i.e., conscience, we find that the two (benevolence and self-
love) are co-ordinated from a perspective which unequivocally 
transcends both. The essential nature of man is realized 
through a due proportion, which includes, among other things 1 
1 
a proper balance between self-love and benevolence~ 
Man has a particular destiny or telos. This is 
achieved through ordered fulfilment of the various human 
propensions. Maximum happiness is likewise achieved through 
the proper fulfilment of the self in relation to 11 objects 11 
(we would prefer the term 11objectives'u) which are by nature 
suited to it. 
The judgments of conscience and those of cool self-
love coincide in fact, but not in essence. Conscience con-
cerns the consonance of acts with the'einai or destiny 
(telos} of man. Cool self-love concerns the consonance of 
acts with an in?ividual's long range interests. Whether or 
not this distinction can be sustained as an issue which we 
libid., pp. 216-217, et passim. 
1 
shall consider further in another section. 
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Both conscience and self-love call for maximum ful-
filment of the self. A further distinction between these 
two principles concerns the fact that the criteria of ful-
filment changes a bit in the shift from one perspective to 
the other,.. Regarding n love of our neighbor,_ 11 Butler writes, 
~is, considered as a virtuous principle, is gratified 
by a consciousness of endeavoring to promote the good 
of others; but considered as a natural affection, its 
gratification consists in the actual accomplishment of 
this endeavor .. 2 
In his ,.Dissertation upon the Nature of Virtue" 
Butler writes,. 
It ought to be observed, that the object of this 
faculty [conscience} is actions, comprehending under 
that name active or practical principles~ those 
principles from which men would act, if occasions and 
circumstances gave them power, and.which, when fixed 
and habitual in any personJ we call his character.3 
Moral fulfilment is thus constituted by an ordering 
of the personality, whether this be prior to, or a concomit-
.ant of overt activity. The same line of thought is also 
suggested by a comparison between human and mechanical 
organization. 11A machine is inanimate and passive; but we 
are agents. Our constitution is put in our own power •• .4 
1chapter III. 
3Ibid., I, 400. 
2 Butler, Works, II) 201. 
4Ibid., II, 10. 
Therefore, we ~are accountable for any disorder or viol-
1 
ation of it.n Thus the perspective of conscience may be 
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contrasted with that of cool self-love, though both happen 
to lead in the same direction. 
3. Ontological Considerations 
In the foregoing sections particular propensions 
and particular principles of action have been considered. 
It is now incumbent upon us to place these details of human 
nature in a synoptic perspective. The issue here might be 
stated as that of the·one and the many in human nature. 
i. The Unity of Human Nature 
In some circles, life according to nature was held 
to be a life in which the impulses could prevail according 
to their natural strength, without restraint or inhibition. 2 
Butler did not challenge the current idealization of life 
according to nature. The point, he insisted, is not whether 
• 
or not man should follow nature. We should indeed follow 
nature; but just what is nature? It is at this point that 
3 Butler's repeated reference to the "whole nature of man 11 
1Ibid. 2 Ibid • I p • 54 • 3Ibid. I p. 34. 
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becomes important. He insists that reality must be seen as 
an orga?ized unity, and not as a mere totality. Whether in 
nature or in art, "the several parts even considered as a 
whole do not complete the idea unless in the notion of a 
whole you include the relations and respects which those 
1 
parts have to each other." 
The [physical J body is a svstem or constitution: so is 
a tree: so is every machine. Consider all the several 
pa~ts of a tree without the natural respects they have 
to each other, and you have not at all the idea of a 
tree~ but add these respects, and this gives you the 
idea.2 
In the Analogy, Butler speaks of moral irregularity 
as that which threatens to "unsettle the adjustments, and 
alter the proportions which formed it, and in which the 
3 
uprightness of its make consisted." One notes in these 
passages an Aristotelian motif. In perception one perceives 
not only particulars, but also a principle of organization 
which composes them into an essential unity. There is no 
entity, either in nature or in art, which can be itself, or 
which can be perceived as itself, apart from this organi-
zation of its constitutive matter. Butler's concept of 
nature, and specifically of human nature might well have 
lrbid., p. 8. 
3Ibid., I, 124. 
2Ibid., pp. 68-69n. 
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been expressed in terms of nforml'l' and nmatter."' 
A human constitution may be disordered, and yet one 
discerns therein the principle of potential ordering which 
1 
constitutes the "real nature 11 of man. This again may be 
illustrated by examples from nature and art. 
The body may be imp?ired by sickness, a tree may d~cay, 
a machine may be out of order, and yet the system and 
constitution of them not totally dissolved. There is 
plainly somewhat which answers to all this in the moral 
constitution of man. 2 
It is the case that we are all in some state o£ approximation 
to the ideal of perfectly integrated wholeness. "Perfection, 
though plainly intelligible and supposable, was never 
3 
attained by any man." 
In the idea of an organized unity one might dis-
tinguish between the Aristotelian concepts of formal cause, 
and of final cause. We must ask not simply how a thing is 
organized but for what purpose or destiny it is intended. 
Many interperters of Aristotle tend tq combine the ideas of 
formal and final cause, and Butle~ often does not partie~ 
ularlyY distinguish between the two in his own ontology of 
human nature. The following passage is one which 
particularly emphasizes the idea of final cause. 
1Ibid. I II I 52. 2Ibid., p. 69n. 
Every work both of nature and of art'is a system: 
and as every particular thing, both natural and 
artificial, is for some use or purpose out of and 
beyond itself, one may add, to what has been 
already brought into the idea of a·system, its 
conduciveness to this one or more ends. 1 
The final cause or purpose of anything might be 
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more simply regarded as its destiny and not necessarily as 
entailing some exterior purpose. In the Analogy we read: 
For of the numerous seeds of vegetables and bodies 
of animals, which are adapted an4 put in the way; to 
improve to such a point or state of natural maturity 
and perfection, we do not see perhaps that one· in a 
million actually does. For the greatest part of them 
decay before they are improved to it; and appear to 
be absolutely destroyed. Yet no one, who does not 
deny all final causes, will deny, that those seeds and 
bodies, which do attain to that point of maturity and 
perfection, answer the end for which they were really 
designed by nature. 2 
This suggests another aspect of the matter. The 
deepest reality of nature, human or otherwise, i9 not 
simply equivalent to the empirically actual. The destiny 
of these "numerous seeds of vegetables and bodies of 
animals" 3 is not ascertained by statistical tabulation of 
what actually happens in each of several million instances. 
With regard to nbrutes" Butler observes that consonance 
with their nature entails no more than to act in response 
1Ibid., p. 8. 2Ibid., I, 131. 
e· 
to their instincts without reflective thought or self-
consciousness. To this Butlex adds: 
It is however to be distinctly noted, that the reason 
why we affirm this is not merely that brutes in fact 
act so; for this alone, however universal, does not 
at all determine, whether such course be correspondent 
to their whole nature. 1 
Likewise with reference to man and that his nature 11 is 
adapted to virtue,n2 Butler writes that "what in fact or 
. 3 
event commonly happens is nothing to this question." 
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The final cause of man is so~ething to be discerned 
in the constitue:ili.:l:ri: parts of his being. The frequency or 
infrequency with which this destiny is fulfilled is 
irrelevant to the question of its status as the real nature 
of man. 
ii. The Uniformity of Human Nature 
Any ethical theory, and particularly one which seeks 
to ground morality in the ideal of human fulfilment must 
come to grips with this question: To what extent are 
individual human destinies unique, and to what extent do 
they coincide to form one universal ideal. The resolution 
of this issue entails two principle steps. These are (1) 
an ontological description of human nature, and (2) a study 
libid., II, 13. 3Ibid., p. 10. 
fJ 
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of implications (of step 1) for the concept of morality. 
In this section we shall seek to interpret Butler in relation 
to step 1 of the above. 
The question of uniformity in human nature is one to 
which Butler does not specifically address himself. Never-
theless, the nature of his assumptions is evident. In 
sermon ii we read: 
However, when the inward frame of man is considered 
as any guide in morals, the utmost caution must be used 
that none make peculiarities in their own temper, or any 
thing which is the effect of particular customs, though 
observable in several, the standard of what is common to 
the species.l 
In the same paragraph Butler writes: 
The attention necessary to survey with any exactness 
what passes. within, have occasioned that i't is not so 
much agreed what is the standard of the internal 
nature of man, ·as of his external form. Neither is 
this last exactly settled. Yet we understand one 
another when we speak of the shape of a human body: 
so likewise we do when we speak of the heart and 
inward principles, how far soever the standard is from 
being exact or precisely fixed. 2 
In these passages Butler comes tantalizingly close 
to opening the subject of uniform natures explicitly. How-
ever, it is clear that for him the problems do not arise 
primarily from diversity of individual constitutions, but 
libid., 51-52. 2Ibid., p. 52. 
0 
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rather from the difficulty of discerning with exactitude 
what the standard and uniform pattern is. Throughout the 
sermons, likewise, repeated reference to the 11Whole nature 
1 
of man 11 is seemingly to something settled and uniform, but 
difficult to discern. 
Another passage which we should note with some care-
fulness occurs in sermon i. Here Butler writes: 
If it be said, that there are persons in the world, 
who are in great measure without the natural affections 
towards their fellow-creatures: there are likewise 
instances of persons without the common natural affec-
tions to themselves: but the nature of man is not to 
be judged of by either of these, but by what appears in 
the common world, in the bulk of mankind. 2 
Here Butler recognizes the fact of some deviation. 
It would seem to follow from this that the proper fulfilment 
of one individual could differ from that of another. Nowhere, 
though, does Butler come near to making such an admission. 
The deviation which Butler recognizes seems clearly to be a 
deviation from something otherwise fixed and normative in 
character. The rational grounds for so easily affirming this 
fixity remains a bit obscure in Butler's system. 
Where certain constituents are given, the idea of 
nature (or the "real nature") as the proper ordering of 
1Ibid., p. 33, et passim. 2Ibid. I pp. 47-48. ' 
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these has some degree of intelligibility (though the idea 
itself may be debatable);. However, with reference to the 
primary constituents themselves it is difficult to see what 
grounds there could be (apart from a theological appeal) 
for a distinction between the actual nature and the real 
nature of a thing. One might think in terms of statistical 
deviation, but this does not quite account for the normative 
character which Butler attributes to the statistically 
dominant type. 
Butler•s appeal to empirical data is for the purpose 
of establishing what the nature of man is; not that this 
nature is in fact uniform or that it ought to be. The 
latter (that it at least ought to be uniform) seems simply 
to be a part of the fixity suggested by the overlapping, 
eighteenth century terms 11naturetu and rnreason. tll 
iii. The Plurality of Human Nature 
It is clear that for Butler there is a basic plural-
ity as well as a basic unity in the human psyche. The 
entire notion of integration or of organization presupposes 
that of constituent parts. We must ask, ~exactly what is 
the nature of these parts in Butler's system, and what is 
the extent of their mutual independence and interdependence?" 
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The total range of components in human nature is . 
indicated by reference to "the several parts of our inward 
nature, 111 or to the various 11principles of action,rr2 or to 
the various rrfaculties ;rp3 . All of these terms seem to be 
equivalent in meaning to Locke's definition of a faculty as 
a power or ability in the mind. 4 
For Butler, the components of human nature include 
the basic propensions or desires together with the regulative 
faculties. Each of these is simply the concurrent desire 
and ability to function in some particular way. The plural-
ity is a plurality of abilities or powers. This in itself, 
does not tell us very much; for the ability to do ene thing 
may entail the concurrent ability to do muc¥ else, though 
the functioning organ, organism, or machine be completely 
indiviaible. Calling each human function a faculty does not 
establish that human nature is divisible into parts. 
One might regard the plurality as a plurality of 
functions, or experiences. Integration, likewise, might be 
regarded as an integration of functions or experiences. 
However, the unified plurality of which Butler writes is 
1Ibid., p. 9, et passim. 
3Ibid., p. 266, et. passim. 
2Ibid., p. 12, et.passim. 
4John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
II, 6, 2; 9, 1; 10; 11, 1-14, et: passim. 
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clearly one which exists in the psyche itself. For instance, 
the judgment of conscience is concerned more with the propen-
sity toward coordipation of functions than with its overt 
occurrence. Butler has in mind a balance in human nature 
which is causally prior to the balance of coordinated, overt 
acts. 
Apart from the question of interpreting Butler one 
might ask why human nature must find fulfilment in a unified 
diversity of experiences. Does this not suggest that the 
psyche itself must constitute some kind of inscrutable 
unity in diversity and diversity in unity? 
I 
-
Butler would tell us that a plurality of components 
in our nature is evident from experience. It has been noted 
that theoretically the propensity to do one thing mqy be 
simply concomitant with the propensity to do something 
else. However, Butler•s point is this: that various of 
these propensities are experienced as irreducible in quality 
to any other. 
The question of the one and the many, whether raised 
with reference to the nature of man, or in some other con-
nection, seems to involve inevitably some tension between 
concern for fidelity to experience, and concern for 
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theoretical "tidiness... In the human mind there is a per-
sistent, but inexplicable drive to "explainw one phenomenon 
by reducing it to another. There is somehow the feeling (if 
not a perception) that a single irreducible is less ultimately 
mysterious than a plurality of irreducibles. When we have 
reduced the number of ultimate components in experience to a 
very few, or to one, the universe of ph~nomena which we 
envision somehow seems "tidier• and less ultimately mysteri-
ous than before. Scientific explanation often takes the 
form of subsuming an otherwise inexplicable event under some 
otherwise known law of predictable occurrences. 
This desire for theoretical simpl~~ity seems to be 
deeply rooted in human nature. There is, however, this 
peril: that considerations. of 11 tidiness".and simplicity may 
lead one to overlook the full and manifold complexity of 
experience. Butler, no less than anyone else is in quest of 
a un~fied order. The unity which he recognizes, however, is 
a unity in diversity. It is a relating of the components of 
experience to each other, and not a clearing of the land-' 
scape by destructive assimilations. Benevolence is not the 
love of exercising one's power and morality is not reducible 
to the phenomenon of social contract for the purpose of 
0 
0 
0 
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procuring a maximum of pleasure. Butler permits the various 
propenaillties to stand in their full integrity. 
One would hardly accuse Butler of doing inThhstice to 
the·manifold plurality of human nature and experience. On 
the other hand, one may wonder whether fidelity to this 
experienced plurality necessarily entails that the various 
propensities be related only externally, as seems to be the 
case in Butler•s system. The unity, of which Butler has so 
much to say seems to be at most only a federation of the 
different parts. One is startled by the apparent ease with 
which Butler seems to envision the theoretical possibility 
of addition or subtraction of constituent parts. The dif-
ference between mankind and animals is simply this: that 
men have certain propensities in addition to those which 
. 1 belong to an1malso On the subject of compassion Butler 
writes: 
This constitution of nature, namely, that it is so 
much more in our power to occasion and likewise to 
lessen misery, than to promote positive happiness, 
plainly required a particular affection, to hinder 
us from abusing, and to incline us to make a right 
use of the former powers, i.e. the powers both to 
occasion and to lessen misery; over and above what 
1 Butler, Works, II, 110. 
was necessary to induce us to make a right use of the 
latter power, that of promoting positive happiness.l 
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Here Butler very casually distinguishes between the propen:::-·· 
Si~ to relieve distress and the propensity to promote 
positive.happiness. Also, each is theoretically capable of 
simple addition to or subtraction from man•s nature, 
evidently without otherw~se effecti~g the other components. 
At the end of this same sermon (sermon vi, rvupon Compassion") 
Butler suggests that in the future state of man 'beyond death, 
"the affection we have been now treating of will happily be 
2 lost, as there will be no objects to exercise it upon." 
In sermon ix, ·~upon Forgiveness of Injuries, u we 
read: 
As God Almighty foresaw the irregular.ities and 
disorders, both natural and moral, which would happen 
in this state of things; he hath graciously made some 
provision against them, by giving us several passions 
and affections, which arise from, or whose objects are 
those disorders •••• They are encumbrances indeed, 
but 'such as we are obliged to carry about with us 
through this various journey of life.3 
These passages suffice to indicate the sort of 
mechanical and atomic divisibility which Butler finds in. 
human nature. At this point Butler exemplifies the overly 
analytic strain in British empiricism. 
1Ibid. 1 p • 120 • 2Ibid. I p. 120. 3Ibid., p. 150., 
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iv. The Social Context of Human Nature 
Sermon i, rrupon Human Nature, rv begins with this text: 
For as we have many members in one body, and all 
members have not the same office: so we, being many, 
are one body in Christ, and every one members one of 
another • 1 · 
Butler considers that it is not 11 an unallowable liberty; 
instead of the body and its members, to substitute the whole 
nature of man, and all the variety o.f internal principles 
which belong ibo it. •• 2 · We now have a ve.ry significant analogy 
before us. Not only do the various parts of man•s constitu-
tion combine to form a whole, but the unity of man himself 
is part of a still larger whole. Butler speaks of "the 
speculative absurdity of considering ourselves as single and 
independent; 113 Th'is, he says, "is the same absurdity, as to 
suppose a hand, or any part to have no natural respect to 
4 
any other, or to the whole body. 11 
In sermon xii we have another explicit statement of 
the same analogy. 
As human nature is not one simple uniform thing, 
but a composition of various parts; .•• so society 
consists of various parts, to which we stand in 
different respects and relations.5 
1Romans 12:4,5. 2Butler, Works, II, 34. 
3Ibid., p. 45. 4 Ibid. 5Ibid., p. 225. 
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Butler is deeply impressed by what he regards as a 
teleologically ordered interlocking of the two patterns. 
The proper ordering of man•s internal relations is 
impossible apart from fulfilment of certain primary impililses 
which reach beyond the individual to become part of the 
external relationships in which he stands. Thus, the psyche 
of man includes public affections such as compassion, and 
1 
ndelight in the esteem of another." 
This again runs parallel to the ontology of 
Aristotle, for whom various component parts properly related 
comprise the individual man, while the individual is again 
part of the matter which goes into the formation of society. 
Again, Aristotle comments upon the necessity of friendship 
2 
and benevolence for even individual fulfilment. 
The health of an organ might be assessed from two 
standpoints. It may be taken individually, or it may be 
evaluated in terms of its role in the larger organic struc-
ture, of which it is a part. It is possible that there may 
be conflict between the organ•s attempt to gain equilibrium 
in relation to its own internal propensities, and its 
attempt to accomplish the same in relation to the larger 
1Ibid., p. 195. 
2Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ll69b, 5-15. 
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whole. There is an analogy here to the structure of society, 
viewed from the standpoint of the. parts and of the whole. 
Butler recognizes the anale.gg, but does not explore it very 
extensively. He is convinced that "the inward frame of man 
does in a peculiar manner answer to the external condition 
1 
and circumstances of life, in which he is placed." That is, 
Butler does not recognize the possibility of tension between 
the goal of internal, and that of external integration. 
There is no place for "ontological guilt" in this yiew of 
man and society. 
At this point we must comment upon Butler•s notion 
of teleology as it bears on the issue. First, is there 
always this perfect correspondence between individual and 
group fulfilment? There is indeed, something profoundly true 
about the observation that man is fundamentally a social 
being,· and that as such he can find individual fulfilment 
only as he gives of himself toward the fulfilment of other 
individuals. In this sense, there is at least a foundation 
in man•s constitution for some kind of equi~ibrium between 
internal and external factors in the quest for integration. 
At the same time, however, there are individual differences 
!Butler, Works, II, 108. 
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which complicate the smooth outworking of this ideal. In 
other words, there is something in human nature which 
inevitably posits this ideal, while there are other factors 
which resist it. The resistance may be of two kinds. In 
the first place, individuals may have serious blocks to 
their own individual achievement of integration, and thus, 
consequently, to their larger integration into the whole of 
society. Such a case does not contradict Butler's theory; 
for here we simply have a coalescence of disintegration in 
both dimensions. However, there is another situation in 
which the only block to maximum individual fulfilment is 
external. That is, the quest for internal integration 
simply leads in a different direction from the quest for 
external integration. Homosexuality sometimes seems to 
involve such an impasse. A second criticism of Butler's 
teleology is this: that it is obviously~e-Darwinian. 
Butler conceived of these relationships in statie terms. 
We now are more conscious of the interaction and mutual 
adjustment which may take place between individuals, and 
which may enter into the formation of racial characteristics. 
Butler correctly discerns that the "real nature 11 of man calls 
for a social context, and thus for an equilibrium between 
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internal and external integration. However, it is no longer 
feasible to hold that all the factors in such an equilibrium 
have been tidily prearranged. 
The analogy of society as an individual organism 
quite aptly illustrates certain points, particularly the two 
dimensions of personal integration and their mutual dependence. 
The organic view of society, however, does have certain . 
significant limitations which Butler would not deny. It is 
urgent that we note this point: that the individual is a 
center of consciousness, and thus of value experience in a 
sense in which society is not. While an individual must find 
fulfilment through contribution to value experience beyond 
himself, the other to which he contributes can only be an 
individual or individuals as himself. Society is not an 
·end in itself but is only a means to the proper fulfilment 
of individuals of which it is composed. 
CHAPTER III 
THE NATURE OF MORALITY 
In the foregoing chapters we have anticipated 
Butler's concept of morality as fidelity to nature. This 
anticipation.has been explicit in various passages as well 
as implicit in the total organization of our exposition. 
Butler's concept of human nature has been set forth as a 
foundation for considering his concept of mor~lity and the 
basic issues which it raises. 
1. Nature as the Criterion of Moral Right 
Sermons ii and iii llUpon Human Nature" are headed 
by this text: "For when the Gentiles, which have not the 
law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, 
1 
having not the law, are a law unto themselves." 
Butler denies that revelation {in the traditional 
sense} alone tells us of the moral law. Revelation is only 
"a republication of natural religion." 2 In Butler's 
language, the moral law is nwritten upon our hearts; and 
1 Romans 2:14. 2 Butler, Works, I, 188; cf. II, 278. 
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1 
interwoven into, our very nature." Virtue is "the natural 
law we are born under, and the whole constitution of man 
[is] plainly adapted to it. " 2 '~From his make, constitution, 
or nature, tman] is in the strictest and most proper sense 
a law to himself." 3 To be virtuous is:to be oneself in the 
deepest sense. In sermon xiv there is an eloquent passage 
in which Butler refers to "this restless scene of business 
and vain pleasures, which now diverts us from ourselves."4 
i. Reason and Desire 
When Butler speaks of man's nature he does so in an 
inclusive sense which takes into full account both desire 
and reason. For Kant, on the other hand, there is a sharp 
distinction between the dictates of reason and duty and 
those of natural desire. An act is moral only if it pro-
ceeds from a sense of duty alone. Within this framework it 
becomes a bit difficult to give positive content to morality. 
For Butler there is no sharp antithesis between reason and 
duty on the one hand, and desire on the other. Moral duty 
finds fulfilment in the proper ordering and expression of 
basic desires.· In this respect, Butler is nearer to 
1Ibid., I, 205; cf. II, 282, 404. 
3Ibid. I p. 69. 4Ibid. I p. 251. 
2Ibid. I II I 33. 
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Aristotle than to Kant. Unlike Aristotle, however, Butler 
speaks disparagingly of man 1 s power to acquire theoretical 
knowledge, and the possession itself of knowledge is not 
• I 1 1 1" • l regarded as 1mportant to man s mora se f-rea 1zat1on. 
"It is the gaining and not the having ~f it112 which is 
important. That is, the conscientious pur~uit of knowledge 
belongs to the proper unfolding of man 1 s powers through 
which he'becomes himself. 
ii. The Actual and the Ideal 
It is important to note that Butler regards the 
actual situation of man and of society as highly defective. 
We are told that the traces of God 1 s image upon human nature 
have become faint, but are still plainly discernible. 3 The 
real nature or destiny of man is thus not to be ascertained 
statistically. If Butler had seen the Kinsey report he 
might well have responded that "what in fact or event 
• • . t~'l-..:. • .. 4 
commonly happens 1s noth1ng to ~)J.i!S quest1on. 
iii. Order and Disorder 
Man 1 s moral constitution, no less than his physical 
1Ibid., p. 270; cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 
1177a, 7--1178a, 5. 
2Ibid., p. 270. 3Ibid., p. 37n. 4 Ibid., p. 10. 
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constitution consists of component parts properly ordered. 
It is from considering the relations which the several 
appetites and passions in the inward frame have to 
~ach other, and, above all, the supremacy of reflectio~ 
or conscience, that we get the idea of the system or 
constitution of human nature. , 
And from the idea itself it will as fully appear, 
that this our nature, i.e. constitution, is adapted to 
virtue, as from the idea of a watch it appears, that 
its nature, i.e. constitution or system, is adapted to 
measure time,l 
The final cause or destiny of man is thus to be properly 
ordered, or virtuous, In Aristotelian language, Butler 
tells us that 11virtue • ... consists in the due proportion. 112 
Man •·s nature is violated far more seriously by moral 
disorder than by physical disorder. 11Nothing can possibly 
be more contrary to nature than vice; ~ .• • Poverty and dis-
grace, tortures and death, are not so contrary to it. 113 
Pain and injustice are both contrary to man~s nature. The 
difference is this; that pain, poverty, disgrace, tortures, 
and death are 11only contrary to our nature considered in a 
partial view ~ ~ • whereas the latter [injustice} is 
contrary to our nature, considered in a higher sense, as a 
1Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
2Ibid., p. 2177 cf., Aristotle, Nicbmachean Ethics, 
ll07a, 1. 
3Butler, Works, II, 10. 
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t d t ' t ' sJ. sys em an cons 1 ut1on. 
A lack of sympathy follows from 11 somewhat amiss in 
2 
the moral characterrr just as a lack of appetite follows 
3 from a disease of the body. Furthermore, the perpetration 
of evil upon someone else does far more harm to oneself 
than to any other. 4 In the Analogy Butler writes: 
Now it is impossible to say, how much even the first 
full overt act of irregularity might disorder Ehe in-
ward constitution, • • • but ~epetition of irregulari-
ties would produce habits. And thus the constitution 
would be spoiled; and creatures made upright, become 
corrupt and depraved in their settled character • 
• • • But on the contrary, these creatures might have 
improved ••• by the contrary behaviour.5 
Thus good or evil acts enter into the formation of our 
'• 
character. The idea of consonance with man•s nature is 
possibly better expressed by the phrase, 11consonance with 
man•s destiny. 11 An act is not judged to be right or wrong 
on the basis of consonance as a merely formal characteris-
tic. The moral quality of an act follows from its conson-
ance in a dynamic sense, with the ongoing process of 
ordering or of disordering in the psyche. 
1Ibid., p. 68; cf. 10. 2 . Ib1d., pp. 108-109. 
4Ibid., p. 165. 5 Ibid., I, 124-125. 
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iv. The Individual and the Whole 
An important aspect of the "due proportionn concerns 
the relation between benevolence and self-love. Butler com-
ments at some length upon the biblical injunction, "Thou 
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. 111 Here he sees the 
ideal of a proper balance, with due consideration given to 
both the self and the neighbor. It is practically superflu-
ous to mention the fact that "mankind almost universally 
b~ing in vanity, supplies for what is called a life of 
pleasure, covetousness, or imaginary notions of superiority 
over others, to determine this question."2 On the other 
hand, "We are in a peculiar manner • • • intrusted with our-
selves; and therefore care of our own interests, as well as 
of our conduct, particularly belongs to us." 3 Obligations 
to benevolence must be balanced by considerations of ~what 
is a competent care a:r;td provision for ourselves. 114 
We have defined Butler's concept of morality in 
terms of fideli.ty to one 1 s nature. The passages cited 
above, however, might seem to suggest another motif: 
namely, that of fidelity to a law of ,reason which transcends 
1Romans 13:9. 2Butler, Works, II, 217. 
3Ibid., p. 219. 4 Ibid., p. 217. 
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one individual in order to include the claims of all others. 
Another way of· expressing this motif would be in terms of 
fidelity to nature as an overarphing and inclusive reality, 
rather than as an individual pature. However, Butler•s 
concept of morality does not seem to proceed along the lines 
of this broader motif. Virtue consists fundamentally in 
fidelity to'ari essential pattern to be discerned within the 
parts of one•s own nature. Within the context of the 
passages cited above from sermon xii, Butler writes: 
There is a greater. variety of parts in what we call a 
character, than there are features in a face: and the 
morality of that is no more determined by one part, 
than the beauty.or deformity of this is by one single 
feature: each is to be judged of by all the parts or 
features, not taken singly, but together. 1 
From sermons i, ii, and iii, "Upon Human Nature,n 
it is unmistakably clear what Butler means by "nature" and 
by the ideal of fidelity to nature. The reference here is 
unequivocably to man•s individual nature. Thus, ~the . 
correspondence of actions to the nature of ·the agent renders 
them natural: their disproportion to it, unnatural ... 2 
This emphasis upon the individual and his nature 
raises the question of relationship between the individual 
1Ibid.' p. 214. 2Ibid., p. 75. 
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and the larger context of which he is a part. Here we come 
to Butler's concept of teleological ordering. 
The inward frame of man does in a peculiar manner 
answer to the external condition and circumstances 
of life, in which he is placed. This is a particular 
instance of that general observation of the Son of 
Sirach: All things are double one against another, 
and God hath made nothing imperfect. The several 
passions and affections in the heart of man, compared 
with the circumstances of life in which he is placed, 
afford to such as will attend to them, as certain 
instances of final causes, as any whatever, which are 
more commonly alleged for such: since those affec-
tions lead him to a certain determinate course of 
action suitable to those circumstances; as (for 
instance) compassion, to relieve the distressed. 1 
The relation of man's nature to external factors is brought 
into proper Butlerian focus in a comment upon the virtue of 
living "a quiet and peaceful life in all godliness and 
2 honesty." Butler writes that "to this the constitution of 
our nature carries us; and our external condition is adapted 
to it. 113 
Returning now to Butler's concept of an ideal 
balance between self-love and benevolence, it is clear that 
this follows from the strpcture of man's nature. This 
structure teleologically coincides with the rights and needs 
of the neighbor. 
1Ibid., pp. 108-109. 2I Timothy 2:2. 
3Butler, Works, II, 361. 
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Morality does indeed entail a great deal more than 
concern for oneself and one•s own nature alone. The point, 
however, is this: that one does not begin with the univer-
sal and then proceed to oneself and one•s neighbor as 
particulars. Rather, the fundamental motif is that of 
fidelity to one•s own nature. This motif, if followed, 
quickly leads one beyond his nature into a broader type of 
concern. The law of one•s nature leads one to a concern 
which is inclusive of more than that nature alone. Thus it 
is that conscience, as the law of our nature, has a universal-
ity which includes and transcends our own well-being as well 
as that of our neighbor. One can find self-fulfilment only 
by following the deeper impulses of his nature in active 
concerns which transcend the self. 
We should comment more specifically upon the ~e~ 
l~tfumn of conscience to the idea of integrated wholeness. 
Under the dominance of particular propensions, the s·elf is 
divided in its interests. Self-conscious reflection upon 
the remoter c~nsequences of these propensions brings 
coordination under the regulative principles of self-love 
and benevolence. In one sense, self-love might be regarded 
as the more inclusive of the two since it leads the self to 
\ 
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fulfil all of its propensions. On the other hapd, when self-
love is not kept within its proper bounds it becomes self-
defeating. The self can fulfil itself only through a 
spontaneous and 11 disinterested11 expression of itself. Exces-
sive dominance of self-love springs from defensiveness and 
ultimately becomes a disintegrating rather than an integrat-
ing force. Thus self-love and benevolence as coordinate 
regulative faculties entail at least a duality.in man's 
nature. To assimilate benevolence to self-love is to destroy 
it. We are therefore in quest of a higher principle under 
which the self can gather itself together.. This higher 
principle is found in conscience. Conscience, as the law of 
our nature.calls for a due proportion among all aspects of 
our nature. 
The due proportion, or virtue, is sought for itself 
alone. It is a disinterested pursuit. 1 One is mot~vated' 
toward virtue by reason of its own intrinsic value, as well 
as through recognition of the authoritative promptings of 
conscience. The affection toward virtue, o£ which the 
rational mind alone is capable, unites in its essence all 
other affections. 
1 Butler, Works, II, pp. 228, 234. 
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v. Moral Law and Theology 
It is important to note the autonomy of morality in 
relation to the idea of divine fiat in Butler's account. 
As Duncan-Jones observes, 
Butler did not hold that ethical notions can be analyzed 
in terms of God's will. The words •good~ and •right' do 
not mean 'what God desires or commands'; and •bad' and 
'wrong~ do not mean 'what displeases God or is forbidden 
by God. •l 
Morality is sometimes regarded as essentially a 
matter of acquiescence to ext~rnal nemands by Deity. For 
Butler, moral duty is to be defined in terms of a demand 
which arises from one's own nature. This demand is valid 
prior to any belief in divine concurrence. 2 The obligation 
of a man to obey his conscience is simply this: that it is 
the law of his nature. 
We experience the moral demand as something not ·re-
d~cible to the idea of commandment by God. This does not 
mean that on~ may not postulate a traditional theism as the 
ground of the possibility of such experiences. In fact, 
Butler repeatedly does suggest such a line of thought. nThe 
law of virtue written upon our hearts"3 constitutes an 
lDuncan-Jones, p. 142. 
2Butler, Works, I, 173, i74; II, 70, 71, 200, 
et,. passim,., 
3Ibid., II, 404; cf. 282, eu passim. 
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evidence for belief in God. The point, however, is this: 
that epistemically the law of virtue is experienced as both 
prior to, and independent of theistic faith. One's obli-
gation to obey the law of his nature is not contingent 
upon whether or not he goes on to draw certain conclusions 
as to the metaphysical ground of that nature. 
To place the matter in a more adequate theologica~ 
perspective, it is also true that Butler regarded creation 
as theophany and man's nature as an expression of God's will • 
.. 
There is, however, a crucial distinction to be drawn 
between the concept of moral law as the will of God spoken 
through man's nature, and that of m0ral law as the will pf 
.God spoken~ man's nature. It is the former which repre-
sents Butler's point of view. Further, as has been noted, 
the law of virtue is.regarded as the law of one's nature and 
as obligatory independently of whether one also comes to 
regard it in any theological sense. 
2. Morality and Value 
In this section we are concerned with ~he nature of 
moral value, and its relation to other values in Butler's 
system. · 
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i. Duty and Personal Interest 
A recurring motif in the writings of Butler concerns 
the coincidence of duty and interest. This was a crucial 
part of Butler's defense of morality in an age which dis-
paraged motives other than those of self-interest. Butler 
wanted to demonstrate that the incentive to virtue was just 
as respectably interested as any other. 
Theoretically, there are two ways in which duty and 
interest might coincide. On the one hand these may be 
analytically aistinct though in fact conjoined, and on the 
other hand, the reward or ninterestedness" of virtue may be 
intrinsic to virtue itself. 
In line with the first of these_. alternatives, Butler 
notes that man's moral discernment is accompanied by a 
great deal of npower over each other's happiness and 
1 
misery." Mankind itsel:l; thus comes to confer certain 
advantages and rewards upon those who are virtuous. 
Though the generality of the world have little regard 
to the morality of their own actions, and may be sup-
posed to have less to that of others • • • yet let any 
one be known to be a man of virtue, somehow or other 
he will be favoured, and good offices will be done 
him, from regard to his character without remote views, 
occasionally, and in some low degree, I think, by the 
1 . Butler, Works, I, 77. 
generality of the world, as it happens to come in 
their way.l 
In his preface to the Fifteen Sermons Butler con-
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siders the case of one (a sceptic) who is not convinced that 
virtue will bring maximum happiness. Since his own happi-
ness or interest is an obligation, would he then be under 
conflicting obligation: one, to maximize his own happiness, 
and the other to be virtuous? Butler answers that the 
authority of conscience entails an obligation in this case 
which clearly supersedes that of supposed interest. 2 nThe 
greatest degree of scepticism • • • will still leave men 
under the strictest moral obligation, whatever their opinion 
be concerning the happiness of virtue."3 The important 
thing to note here is the distinction between virtue and 
happiness or interest. The obligation to act in a way which 
is consonant with one's nature may be distinguished from the 
obligation to maximize one's happiness. 
In his lfDissertation upon the Nature of Virtue In 
Butler observes that "our sense or discernment of actions as 
morally good or evil-implies in it a sense or discernment of 
these as of good or ill desert. 114 
1Ibid. I p. 74. 
4Ibid., I, 401. 
2Ibid., II, 14-16. 3Ibid., p. 16. 
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Also, throughout the Sermons and the Analogy, wherever 
Butler discusses the coincidence of duty and interest, 
there is implicitly the idea that happiness and virtue ought 
to be conjoined. This is strikingly similar to the Kantian 
analysis of moral consciousness. 
In the Sermons Butler regards the present conjunction 
of virtue and happiness as almost complete, though with some 
exceptions. 
It is manifest that, in the common course of life, 
there is seldom any inconsistency between our duty 
and what is called interest: it is much seldomer that 
there is an inconsistency between duty and what is 
really our present interest; meaning by interest, 
happiness and satisfaction. 
Self-love then, though confined to the interest of 
the present world, does in general ~erfectly coincide 
with virtue; and leads us to one and the same course 
of life. But, whatever exceptions there are to this, 
which are much fewer than they are commonly thought, 
all shall be set right at the final distribution of 
things. 1 
This is a typical statement of Butler's position as we find 
it in the Sermons. Sometimes, Butler seems to speak as if 
the coincidence were complete. In such passages he is either 
speaking in a general and imprecise manner, or else includ-
ing in the scope of his calculation a theological conviction 
with regard to the ultimate "conduct arid administration of a 
perfect mind."2 
libid., II, 74-75. 2Ibid., p. 75. 
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In the Analogy, published ten years later than the 
Sermons, one finds the same motif, though with a bit more 
recognition of present divergence in experience between 
virtue and happiness. Also, and of more significance, the 
present conjunction of virtue and happiness is set within 
the framework of a larger cosmic and historic perspective. 
That virtue and happiness are conjoined to a significant 
extent in the present state is an indication of God 1 s moral 
governance. This present governance, and conjunction of 
virtue and happiness is regarded as a tendency which must 
inevitably go on to perfect fulfilment (i.e. perfect 
1 
coincidence) in the Kingdom of God beyond history. 
Butler cites imaginary instances of encounter 
between rational men and physically powerful beasts. Upon 
initial encounter, the advantage will be overwhelmingly on 
the side of brute power, rather than of human rationality. 
In the long range, however, through calculation and or~ani-
zation, in the process of time the advantage will shift over-
whelmingly to the side of reason. 
Likewise, there is in the very nature of things a 
tendency for virtue to become conjoined with happiness and 
libid., I, 81-94. 
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external advantage. 11 God has, by our own reason, given us 
to see a peculiar connection in the several parts of this 
scheme, and a tendency towards the completion of it arising 
out of the very nature of virtue."1 Butler seeks to show 
that it is not unreasonable to postulate the completion of 
this scheme beyond history. 
In the Sermons, Butler tells us simply that 
Duty and interest are perfectly coincident; for the 
most part in this world, but entirely and in every 
instance if we take in the future and the whole; 
this being implied in the notion of a good and per-
fect administration of things.2 
In the Analogy we find exactly the same idea, though expanded 
into a more metaphysically grandiose scheme. 
Thus far in our examination of Butler's view we have 
found a principal reward of virtue to consist in something 
external to it, but with which it becomes progressively 
conjoined in the total scheme of things. We must now turn 
our attention to another~pect of Butler's thought. 
Particularly in the Sermbns, there are significant, and well 
devel~ped ideas which seem to be converging toward a state-
ment of the case in terms of an intrinsic, rather than of 
an extrinsic conjunction of virtue and interest. 
1Ibid., p. 89. 2Ibid., II, 76. 
Butler insists that one who violates his "realn 
nature inflicts very real damage upon himself. 
ever did a designed injury to another, but at the same 
1 
time he did a much greater to himself." Also, "injury, 
unjustice, oppression, the baseness of ingratitude • • • 
102 
are • • • the objects of compassion, as they are their own 
punishment."2 An evil act inflicts more damage upon the 
self than poverty, disgrace, tortures, and death. 3 
The chief good of man is found to consist in the 
ordered fulfilment of himself in relation to appropriate 
objectives. There is first the ordered fulfilment of 
ordinary desires. The proper orderedness of soul,· which is 
virtue, becomes itself an objective to be sought, and it is 
in this that man finds his most complete fulfilment. Love 
of virtue becomes merged with a mystical love of-God. The 
latter subject is beyond the scope of this study, except to 
note that in the fulfilment of this affection one finds that 
"which may fill up all our capacities of happiness,"4 and 
"in which our souls may find rest. uS Here we find that the 
1Ibid., p. 165. 2Ibid. 3Ibid., p. 10. 
4Ibid., p. 250. 5Ibid. 
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reward of virtue is intrinsic tGEtheDexperience itself. 
Progressive realization of harmony with one's own essential 
nature is·a value in itself which surpasses all others. 
This corresponds to the classic~! contentions of 
Socrates, particularly in the Protagoras and in the :ctorgias, 
that health of soul is its own reward, and more to be 
desired than any other good, and that injustice (or a 
fundamental lack of orderedness} in the soul is 11 the great-
est of human evils 111 and one which warrants correction at 
any cost. In the Platonic sense of happiness, even 11 the 
great king 112 is unhappy if unjust. 3 
The deeper trend of thought in Butler's Sermons 
moves unmistakably along these lines. Unfortunately, how-
ever, it is the other motif, noted above, which comes to 
prevail in Butler's later work, the Analogy. Both lines of 
thought occur initially in the Sermons. It is the less 
penetrating of these two (in our opinion) which Butler 
carries on to completion in the Analogy. 
In the one case, there is emphasis upon the co~nci­
dence of virtue with happiness and external advantage, 
under the righteous administration of God. In the other 
1Plato, _GGorgias, 509. 
3Ibid. I 471-474. 
2Ibid., 471. 
\ 
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case, the emphasis is upon health of soul as an intrinsic 
value. This, no less than health of the body is intrinsi-
cally good, and does not need buttressing by other consid-
erations. 
ii. The Nature of Moral Value 
We have seen that there is a "disinterestedn attrac-
tion of the soul toward virtue, and that virtue is intrinsi-
cally valuable. We ]shall now inquire as to the nature and 
locus of this value. 
In approaching this s~bject one should observe that 
it is one to which Butler does not consciously address him-
self. We know only that man is attracted to virtue, and 
that he finds satisfaction in its attainment. As to the 
nature of its value, we can only suggest and explore several 
possibilities. 
One should also be advised that there is sometimes 
a bit less than absolute consistency in Butler's thought. 
Tomkins observes that Butler wcombines intuitionism, 
hedonism, utilitarianism, theological perfectionism and many 
other theories which have since his time become mutually 
exclusive."1 Messner writes that in the "Dissertation Upon 
lsilvan Solomon Tomkins, Conscience, Self Love and 
Beneyolence in the System of Bishop Butler (Ph~D. Thesis, 
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1934), p~ 49~ 
~· 
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the Nature of Virtue" there is "the beginning of that dis-
tinction between •intuitional 1 and 1utilitarian 1 ethical 
1 
theory 11 and that "both sides of the debate appear incon-
2 
sistently in Butler Is work a II These comments suggest that 
one should beware of hasty categorizations o£ Butler in 
terms of ethical theories which have developed since his 
time. 
To come more specifically to Butler•s concept of 
moral value, this much is clear: that whatever its precise 
nature and locus, it is unique, and not reducible to a mere 
totality of other values. Commenting upon the insights of 
ancient philosophers, Butler writes: 
They had a perception that injustice was 
their nature, and that pain was so also. 
there two perceptions totally different, 
degree, but in kind.3 
contrary to 
They observed 
not in 
One interpretation of Butler is that he held 
implicitly to the view that moral good (or value) is in-
definable. Several decades ago, G. E. Moore along with 
others promoted a point of view which rejected hedonism but 
yet held that "right'r'\\El.s completely definable in terms of 
the good. The good was a category which included much more 
1E. c. Mossner, Bishop Butler and the Age of Reason 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936), p. 120~ 
2Ibid. 3Butler, Works, II, 68. 
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than happiness. The idea of goodness was perfectly simple 
and lucid, though indefinable in terms other than itself. 
For instance, wisdom, justice, and beauty were good quite 
independently of their capacities for promoting happiness. 
Thus, one might say that it is simply and irreducibly good 
for a man to fulfil the destiny of his nature, and that 
this goodness is not to be defined in terms of subjective 
satisfaction. There are a number of passages which suggest 
that Butler•s point of view does indeed follow along these 
lines. 
Virtue consists in a due proportion or balance. 
This fundamental balance is itself objectified by Butler as 
an object of affection. 
Human nature is so constituted, that every good affec-
tion implies the love of itself; i.e. becomes the 
object of a new affection in the same person~ Thus, 
to be righteous, implies in it the love of righteous-
ness; to be benevolent, the love of benevolence; to 
be good, the love of goodness; whether this righteous-
ness, benevolence 1 or goodness, be viewed as in our 
own mind, or in another•s.l 
. . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
To be just, a good, a righteou~ man, plainly carries 
with it a peculiar affection to or love of justice, 
goodness, righteousness, when these principles are the 
objects of contemplation.2 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
lButler, Works 1 II, 228. 2Ibid., p. 234. 
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There are certain ideas, which we express by the 
words, order, harmony, proportion, beauty, the 
furthest removed from any thing sensual. Now what is 
there in those intellectual images, forms, or ideas, 
which begets that approbation, love, delight, and 
even rapture, which is seen in some persons~ faces 
upon having those objects present to their minds?1 
There are passages in which Butler clearly stresses 
the non-utilitarian character of moral right. In a foot-
note to sermon xii he writes: '~Fidelity, honour, strict 
justice, are themselves approved in the highest degree, 
2 
abstracted from consideration of their tendency.ra ~ese 
and "numberlessn other virtues nare approved or disapproved 
by mankind dm general, ill:b.nquite another view than as conduc-
ive to the happiness or misery of the world." 3 In his 
"Dissertation Upon the Nature of Virtue 11 Butler makes 
4 
exactly the same contention in similar language. 
Butler also writes that if man were not so imper£ect, 
reason alone might provide sufficient impetus toward virtue~ 
In the present state, however, it is necessary that reason 
be njoined with those affections which God has impressed 
upon his heart. 115 It is then that we come to "act suitably 
1Ibid. 1 P• 252 • 2Ibid., p. 227n. 
4Ibid., I, 408-409. 
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0 1 to our nature." This line of thought, which we find in 
both the Sermons and the Analogy suggests that consider-
ations of happiness together with reason are moving forces 
Which propel us toward some other part~cular value (i.e. 
virtue) • This also seems to make of virtue some indefinably 
valuable formula. 
It is everywhere assumed by Butler that one will 
recognize fidelity to the due proportion of one's essential 
nature as a sup~emely desirable good, though the nature of 
its desirability is not made clear. Thus it is that some 
interpret Butler as holding that virtue is simply indefin-
0 ably good. 
Apart from the issue of p~operly interpreting 
Butler, what are the merits of this point of view (i.e., 
that of moral.good as indefinable in Moorets sense). One 
cannot deny that there are basic components of experience 
which can only be defined ostensively.. Whether Jllthe good_'r 
or any other "object •r (or rather, in this case, quality) is 
properly to be regarded as such cannot be reduced to a 
question of logic. It can only be tested by experience, and 
one's perception in experience may or may not coincide with 
0 
1Ibid.r cf. I, 95. 
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that of someone else. With regard to Moorets concept of 
moral good as an irreducible and indefinable quality, Brand 
Blanshard writes: 
When moralists began to think about Moore~s analysis, 
~any of them had to report doubt whether they had 
ever known such a quality and indeed whether there 
was any such quality to know. It was a philosophic 
will-o~-the-wisp that ~s$o~ved when one tried to lay 
hold of it.l 
Blanshard insists that the qual,ity of goodness·is "more 
firmly rooted in human nature112 than is suggested by Moore 
and other ideal utilitarians. Specifically it must have its 
locus in consciousness, and must consist of ~atisfaction and 
fulfilment of impulse. 3 We agree with Blanshard's criticism 
of this point of view. 
There is another way in which it is possible to 
interpret ~utler. ~o say that man has an affection toward 
virtue may mean that there is a deeply rooted urge to 
achieve the sort of integrated wholeness which is somehow 
implicit in the various parts of his psyche. This is a 
fundamental nisus toward his own destiny. This is not a 
desire for a maximum or ordinary satisfactions; its objec-
tive is reached when the psyche is properly ordered. 
1 Blanshard, p. 17. 3Ibid., p. 23. 
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Virtue as well as all other· "goodsn ha.s value inso-
far as it satisfies human need. Virtue satisfies the need 
for wholeness, and for integration. This whol~ness brings 
satisfaction which is of maximum quality and inclusiveness, 
and it is in this satisfaction uhat the value of virtue 
consists. The need which virt~e suppli~s is unique, and the 
quaLity of subjective awareness upon fulfilment is also 
unique. 
There is a crucial and highly controversial passage 
in sermon xi which should be cited in connection with this 
question. Here Butler writes: 
Religion • • • is so far £rom disowning the principle 
of self-love, that it often addresses itself to that 
very principle, and always to the mind in that state 
when reason presides; • ~ • Our ideas of happiness 
and misery are of all our ideas the nearest and most 
important to us; that they will, nay, if you please, 
that they ought to prevail over those of order, and 
beauty, and harmony, and proportion, i~ there should 
ever be, as it is impossible there ever should be, 
any inconsistence between them: though these last 
too, as expressing the fitness of actions, are real 
as truth itself. Let it be allowed, though virtue or 
moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to 
and pursuit of what is right and good, as such, yet, 
that when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither 
justify to ourselves this or any pursuit, till we are 
convinced that it will be
1
for our happiness, or at 
least not contrary to it. 
1Butler, Works, II, 206. 
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. Many interpreters of Butler dismiss this passage as 
not really representative of his thought. 1 Elsewhere, Butler 
asserts that conscience must prevail over consideration of 
self interest (•rmeaning by interest, happiness and satisfac-
tion11)2 if there should ever be any conflict. 3 A possible 
interpretation may be this: that elsewhere Butler speaks of 
interest or of self-love only with re£erence to ordinary, 
non-moral satisfaction. Here, he expands the idea of self-
love to include the ultimate satisfaction of man's quest for 
wholeness. It also seems here that the abstract qualities of 
order and proportion receive their ultimate warrant as ideals 
in the fact that they satisfy human need. 
In this ±ine of thought we should also cite a 
passage from sermon xii. Here Butler notes: rrit is mani-
fest that nothing can be of consequence to mankind or any 
4 
creature, but happiness. 11 This also suggests that subjec-
tive awareness must inevitably be the locus of any value. 
Though virtue is the satisfacti9n of man's deepest 
need, its pursuit is disinterested in that it spring £rom 
lFor instance A. E. Taylor and C. D~ Broad. 
2Butler, Works, II, 74. 3Ibid., pp. 14-16. 
4Ibid., p. 224. 
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the free and spontaneous exercise of a fundamental propen-
sion. The propension is under the direction of reason 1 
though reason·does not supply the motivation. 
In the Analogy Butler speaks of the exercise of 
1 
virtue as a habit which comes to be formed. The faculty 
of reflection is active in promoting the formation of this 
habit. The habit 1 when formed permits a maximum of 
spontaneous disinterestedness. 
We have noted two possible interpretati~ns of 
Butler with regard to the nature and locus of moral value. 
Fortunately or unfortunatelyr Butler is l~rgely preoccupied 
with the empirical observation that man does discern within 
himself an attraction and an obligation toward virtue. The 
nature of virtue considered as a value 1 and its relation to 
other values 1 is not made completely clear 1 though we do 
know that it is to be regarded in terms. of uniqueness and 
of urgency. 
3. Morality and Obligation 
We have earlier raised the question: nWhy should 
one fulfil his o~ destiny by becoming what he essentially 
A part of the answer has been that there is a value 
2 Chapter Ili 1 section ii. 
'\ 
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intrinsic t~ such realization. In some circles it has 
been warmly insisted that "I ought to do xJ[ adds nothing 
to the statement, rrx has value," and that the statement: 
mr ought to do the goodn is only a somewhat naive tautology. 
Butler tells us that there are two aspects to the 
function of conscience. It not only discerns what is 
right, but also adds to that discernment a peculiar 
1 
urgency which characterizes moral judgment. Butler thus 
indicates his view that the idea of obligation is not 
reducible to the idea of value. 
There is a well known point of view which would 
.reduce the idea of obligation (moral) to cognizance of 
future pu~ishment or reward by God. This is not Butler 1 s 
point of view. Just as the idea of moral right is irreduc-
ible to the idea of divine fiat, thus also is the idea of 
moral obligation irreducible to that of punishment or reward 
by God. Thus he writes: 
But allowing that mankind hath the rule of right 
within himself, yet it may be asked, •what obliga-
tions are we under to attend to and follow it?• I 
answer: it has been proved that man by his nature is 
a law to himself, without the particular distinct 2 
consideration of the positive sanctions of that law. 
1Butler, Works, II, 16, 71, 214, et,_ passim. 
2Ibid., p.7o. 
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. . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . 
Though men should, through stupidity or speculative 
scepticism, be ignorant of, or disbelieve, any author-
ity in the universe to punish the violation of this law; 
yet, ~f there should be such authority they would be as 
really liable to punishment, as though they had been 
beforehand convinced, that such punishment would follow. 
• • • It is not foreknowledge of the punishment which 
renders us ~bnoxious to it; but merely violating a known 
obligation .. 
For Eutler, the concept of obligation is a primitive 
and irreducible component of moral cognition.. It can neither 
be defined in terms of value, nor of divine retribution. 
This corresponds to tbe view of Professor Bertocci, who 
refers to the sense of noughtness'' as an •rinexpressible 
imperative" which is "different from the psychic quality we 
experience in wanting and feeling compulsion."2 
We might note that for Butler the autonomy of obli-
gation in relation to theological reality is epistemic, 
though not necessarily ontic; We experience the sense of 
obligation as irreducible to any other. It isz however, 
possible to reason from this experience to the ground of 
its possibility. 
libid. I II I 17. 
2peter A. Bertocci, Introduction to the Philosophy 
of Religion {~g"!¢vo.ocGl Cliffs, New 9'ersey: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc .. ~ 1951), p. 242. 
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There is a superior principle of reflection or consci-
ence in every man, which distinguishes between the 
internal principles of his heart, as well as his 
external actions: which passes judgment upon himself 
and them; pronounces determinately pome actions to be 
in themselves just, right, goodr others to be in them-
selves evil, wrong, unjust: which, without being con-
sulted, without being advised with, magisterially 
exerts itself, and approves or condemns him the doer 
of them accordingly: and whichr if not forcibly 
stopped, naturally and always of course goes on to 
an~icipate a higher and more effectual sentence, which 
shall hereafter second and affirm its own. But this 
part of the office of conscience is beyond my present 
design explicitly to consider.l 
4. The Uniformity of Duty 
The subject of uniformity of duty may be distinguished 
from that of the uniformity of conscience: though each has a 
significant bearing upon the other. 
To what extent is the moral law unchanging and uni-
form in its application to all people? Here we are enquir-
ing as to the uniformity of duty. Unless the dictates of 
conscience are regarded as infallible, the uniformity of 
, 
duty may well be greater than the univormity of conscience, 
or of man 1 s perception of duty. We shall see that Butler 
finds a high degree of uniformity with regard to both 
conscience and duty. 
1Butler, Works, ~I, 59; cf. I, 76. 
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Butler writes that man uhath the rule of right within: 
what is wanting is only that he honestly attend to it.n1 
Thus;. 
let any plain honest man, before he engages in any 
course o£ action, ask himself, Is this I am going 
about right, or is it wrong? ls it good, or is it 
evil? I do not in the least doubt~ but that this 
question would be answered agreeably to truth and 
virtue, by almost any fair man in almost any cir-
cuntstance.2 
. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ 
As much as it has been disputed wherein virtue con-
sists, or whatever ground for doubt there may be 
about particularst yet, in general, there is in 
reality an universally acknowledged standard of it. 
It is that, which all ages and all countries have 
made profession of in public~ it is that, -which 
the primary and fundamental laws of all civil 
constitutions over the face of the earth make it 
their business and endeavor to enforce the practice 
of upon mankind.3 
It is possible for the conscience, as well as £or 
any other faculty to be imp~ired. 4 However, for the aver-
age, normal man, there is a general uniformity o£ discern-
ment between right and w~ong. But1erts opinion on this 
point was a part of the general optimism which character-
ized the eighteenth century. 5 
3
:rbid., I, 400. 
4Ibid., pp. 155-156. 5nuncan-Jones, P~ 113. 
117 
The uniformity of conscience suggests the uniform-
ity of duty, and the uniformity of duty suggests (if not 
implies) an ontological assumption with regard to the uni-
formity of human nature. With regard to the latter, 
Eutler•s outlook has been noted in the previous chapter. 
Un~ortunately, empirical observation does not 
ju~tify either Butler's belief that human nature is uniform, 
or that human discernment of right and wrong is generally 
uniform. The question now is this: how can there he uni-
versally valid norms of moral conduct if the constituent 
parts of one man•s nature are such as to entail a 
significantly different type of ordering from that of some-
one else? Might not that which constitutes self-fulfilment 
for one person be different in principle from that which 
constitutes self-fulfilment for someone else? Comparing 
alternative courses of action with individual natures might 
justify homosexuality for one man, and heterosexuality for 
another~ 
Butler has no answer to the problem now under discus-
sion~ His consideration of the issue inevitably terminates 
with the assumption of uniform natures, together with that 
of a teleologically ordered interlocking of these natures 
0 
0 
0 
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into a harmonious whole (i.e., society). 
Butler does recognize several points which are signi~-
i¢anpt in connection with the present issue. Benevolence is 
regarded-as a fundamental and irreducible aspect of human 
nature. lts consonance with self-love follows from the fact 
that there is a lack of balance and an impoverishment in the 
character of any individual who does not achieve ordered ex-
. f th. 11 f th b . . 1 press1on o 1s as we as o o er as1c propens1ons. 
Butler also tells us that individuals are interrelated in a 
structured network which comprises society. 2 From these 
points we may make the general assertion that man is funda-
mentally a social being, and that as such he can find indi-
vidual fulfilment only as he contributes toward the fulfil-
ment of other individuals. 
Now 1 on this basis, some degree of uniformity in 
moral principles may be established from consideration .of 
the consequences which emanate from individual acts through-
out the larger network of relationships in which the 
individual stands. Butler's system is decisively limited 
however in its ability to include such considerations. In 
discussing moral judgment he places very little emphasis 
lButlert Works, II, 186-208, etc. passim. 
2Ibid. 1 P • 225 • 
~ 
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upon long range calc~lation of consequences. The emphasis 
is rather upon an immediate and decisive comparison of 
contemplated acts with individual human nature. 1 
Apart £rom specific consideration of Butler•s point 
of view, we shall make several adtlitional comments on the 
issue. 
The empirical method in ethical theory must take 
judicious account both of similarities and of differences 
in human nature~ It must not be overlooked that despite 
problematic exceptions 1 there is a highly significant 
degree of uniformity in the basic structure of htiman nature. 2 
It is this degree of uniformity which makes society possible 
and whic4 constitutes the basis for some degree of unifo;m-
ity in ethical standards. Professor Bertocci writes: nTo 
the extent that men are made of the same stuff, to the 
extent that they have common motives (like hunger, sex, 
sympathy, tenderness,.wonder), to that extent at least there 
are common value claims .. ''~ ·. 
1 Ibid. , p .. 7 5 , .;:e;..;:t;.,c,_...,~;P::;.:;a~s;;.:s=oJ.-· m;;:.;. 
2see Bertocci, pp. 205-221, 263-264. 
3Ibid., p. 264 .. 
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On the other hand 1 we must take full account of 
individual variations. The appropriate conclusion to be 
drawn from the fact of such variations is that there will 
also be some degree of variation in that which constitutes 
moral fulfilment for different individuals. That is 1 the · 
uniformity of duty must be regarded with a judicious 
degree of flexibility. The relative degree of uniformity 
and of flexibility must be worked out by a balancing of 
individual needs in relation to those of other people ~ith 
whom the individual stands in the total network of social 
relationships. Here it must be recognized that a 
particular judgment of conscience will ultimately impinge 
in some manner or other upon the destinies of many other 
individuals. 
The consideration that man stands in a certain 
relationship to the total social unit and to its welfare 
must be balanced by another important consideration. We 
have noted earlier that the individual constitutes the 
ultimate locus of value. If the total social unit is con-
sidered as such there may result a totalitarian philosophy 
which sacrifices individual values for an illusory value of 
the whole. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE NATURE 0~ MORAL DISCERNMENT 
In previous chapters we have examined the es~ential 
nature of man and the essential nature of moral right in 
Butler 1 s ethical discourses. It remains yet to indicate 
the epistemological basis which Butler gives for moral 
judgment. In the first section we shall indicate very 
briefly the cognitive status of moral judgment and in the 
second section we shall consider the cognitive grounds upon 
which moral judgment is made. 
1. The Cognitive Status of Moral Judgment 
We shall begin by sketching in several sentences, 
the larger epistemological framework within which Butler's 
comments on the subject seem most naturally to fall. 
Language·and discursive thought takes its rise 
initially f~om man's propensity to assign names to the 
various aspects or parts of reality. These initial names, 
or words, can only be defined ostensively. They are 
intelligible insofar as other people have also encountered 
and discriminated the particular aspect of reality which is 
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being designated~ Within the experience of a given person 
as well as throughout the range of all human experience 
one finds that certain aspects of reality are more unifor,mly 
discriminated than others. 
Butler insists that man can and does discriminate 
within himself a certain psychic structure. ~us he writes: 
Now obligations of virtue shown, and motives to the 
practice of it enforced~ f~om a review of the nature of 
man, are to be considered as an appeal to each particu-
lar personrs heart and natural conscience: as the 
external senses are appealed to for the proof of things 
cognizable by them. Since then our inwa~d feelings, 
and the perceptions we receive from our external senses, 
are equally real; to argue from the former to life and 
conduct is as little liable to exception, as to argue 
from the latter to absolute speculative truth •••• 
And as to these inward feelings themselvesr that they are 
real, that man has in his nature passions and af£ec-
tions, can no more be questioned, than that he has 
external senses. Neither can the former be wholly mis-
taken; though to a certain degree liable to greater 
mistakes than the latter.l 
. . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
~he attention necessary to survey with any exactness 
what passes within, have occasioned that it is not so 
much agreed what is the standard of the internal nature 
of man, as of his external form. Neither is this last 
exactly settled. Yet we understand one another when we 
speak of the shape of a human body: so likewise we do 
when we speak of the heart and inward principles, how 
far soever the standard is from being exact or precisely 
fixed.2 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • a • • 
1Butler, Works, Il, 53. 2Ibid., p. 52. 
There are several perceptions daily felt and spoken 
of, which yet it may not be very easy at first view 
to explicate, to distinguish from all others, and 
ascertain exactly what the idea or perception is.l 
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Moral judgment is concerned with data which is as 
real2 and determinate as physical objects. It is however, 
not as clearly perceived by us as the latter. The arnbigu-
ity and imprecision rises from the nature of man•s percep-
tions 1 not from the nature of the data in question. Butler 
is fundamentally an empiricist, but his empiricism is one 
which seeks to take into account the full range of data 
which is present in the If shining present .. n 3 
Each subject must be treated with its own degree of 
precision.. Though moral discernment is clearly a cognitive 
rather than a non-cognitive activity, it is not possible 
for us to delineate this cognition with absolute scientific 
precision. 
This is interestingly reminiscent of Aristotle who 
observed at the outset of his Nicomachean Ethics that the 
2By the word 11 real" we mean, 'r,existent apart from 
cognitive recognition. 11 
3well known terminology of Dr. E. ~- Brightman. 
See, Brightman, Person and Reality, edited by Peter A. 
Bertocci (New York: Tffe Ronald ~ress Company, 1958}. 
discussion will be adequate if it has as much clear-
ness as the subject-matter admits of 1 for precision 
is not to be sought for alike in all discussions. 
• • • It is the mark of an educated man to look for 
precision in each class of things just so far as 
the nature of the subject admits. 1 
2. The Cognitive Grounds of Moral Discernment 
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It is clear now that moral judgment is a cognitive 
function. It is not clear how, or on what basis this cog-
nition occurs. Butler is disappointingly vague on this 
point. Rogers writes: 
Just how conscience acts, whence it derives its 
authority, and what precisely its relation is to the 
further principles of self-love·and benevolence 1 are 
all questions that Butler leaves indeterminate. 
Certainly it does notr like utilitarian reason 1 
accomplish its end by demonstrating the cla~msopf 
virtue as a means to happiness •••• Conscience 
deals in imperatives, and not in arguments; the judg-
ment it pronounces rests on an intrinsic right on the 
part of the highest faculty of man•s nature to take 
command.2 
Conscience is the faculty which organizes the vari-
ous propensions of man•s nature into an integrated whole. 
~ere is a pattern implicit in the various parts of man•s 
nature just as there is a pattern implicit in the various 
mechanical parts o£ a watch. The analogy here is interesting 
and vividr but it leaves one with certain unanswered 
1Aristotle, 1094b, 12, 14. 2Rogers, p. 276. 
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questionsr The mechanical parts of a watch may be discrim-
inated and measured with precision, In the case of the 
human psyche, however, it is far from clear how one is to 
discern a pattern with any analogous degree of certainty~ 
The discrimination of conscience between actions 
might be analyzed into two parts. ~ese are, (1) discern-
ment of man~s ideal character, and (2} the discernment of 
actions as promoting or not promoting the realization of 
this character~ 
We shall now consider the cognitive grounds upon 
which the discriminations of conscience are based~ 
i~ The Role of Intuition 
In Bishop Butler we find aspects of a rationalist 
outlook interestingly combined with empirical intuitionism, 
From Plato, ~ristotle, and the Stoics, as well as from the 
English rationalists, Butler accepted the fundamental con-
cept of reality as an ordered and stru~tured whole. It is 
upon this basic ontological foundation that Butler erects 
his ethical system with the concept of morality as fidelity 
to nature~ Here Butler is in fundamental agreement with the 
English rationalists who were his predecessors and contem-
poraries. When~ however, we move from ontological 
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foundations to the phenomenon of moral judgment, a crucial 
difference emerges. For the rationalist, moral judgment 
was an act of pure reason, uncontaminated by feeling. 
Butler, however, follows Shaftesbury in his conviction that 
man's attunem~nt with the structure of reality is grasped 
by esthetic or empirical intuition as well as by rational 
intuition. 
We are here using the word "intuitionrP to refer to 
all perceptions or discernments of the mind. An empirical 
intuition is one which is non-deductive. 
Butler writes that the ancient moralists nhad a 
perception"1 that pain and injustice were both fundamentally 
contrary to mants nature, and 
the reflecting upon each of them as they thus stood in 
their nature, wrought a ful.l intuitive conviction, 
that more was due and of right belonged to one of these 
inward perceptions, than to the other; that it demanded 
in all cases to govern such a creature as man. 2 
In another passage Butler writes: 
they had some inward feeling or other, which they chose 
to express in this manner; that man is born to virtue, 
that it consists in following nature, and that vice is 
more contrary to this nature than tortures or death.3 
Butler also speaks of one finding within himself "a full 
1Butler 1 Works; II·, p. 11. 
-.2Ibid." p. 6. 
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conviction, that what they [ancient,moralistsJ laid down 
1 
was just and true. 11 Elsewhere Butler notes that nin all 
common ordinary cares we see intuitively at first view what 
is our duty. 112 
·Erom these and other passages, together with the 
absence of warrant for any other interpretation as an alter-
native, we conclude that the urge toward virtue (i.e., toward 
integrated wholeness) is discerned in the same way as one 
discerns any other urge: namely, by empirical intuition. 
Butler's system is here in line with the insight that our 
primary value judgments must necessarily be intuitive. 
Professor Horace T. Lavely observes that in Butler's thought 
•rmoral endeavor is drawn out by a captivating affection 113 
and that ,.thus does he begin to undermine that universal 
confidence in reason, so characteristic of the age in which 
he lived~n4 Reason, in its calculating aspect may implement 
our value judgments, but it cannot form them in the first 
place. This is an anticipation of Hume•s dictum that 
2Ibid. I p. 132. 
3 Lavely, p. 108. 
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11 reason is and ought to be only the slave of the passions.n1 
The fulfilment, in any degree, of man's propension 
toward virtue, is known by its own particular feeling. 
Truth and real good sense, and thorough integrity, 
carry along with them a pecu&iar consciousness of 
their own genuineness: there is a feeling belonging 
to them which does not accompany their counterfeits. 2 
Elsewhere Butler writes that nas we are reasonable 
3 
creatures 11 we ought to choose rrthat course of life 
which sits most easy upon our own mind.114 Here, consonance 
with one •·s own nature is known by the unique feeling of 
poise and of harmony which it entails~ Thus Butler 'finds 
empirical intuition to be a very fundamental part of moral 
judgment. 
Intuition isisometimes regarded a~ an extrem~ly 
occult aff~ir. We would suggest that it need not have such 
connotations. The propension toward integration and whole~ 
ness is no more nor.no less mysterious than any other 
impulse of mants naturew Though Butler himself does not 
state the matter in exactly these terms, we have earlier 
suggested the possibility of regarding this propension in 
lnavid Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. XI, 
part iii, section iii. Cited from L. A. Selby-Biggs, editor, 
A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1960), p. 415. 
2Butler, Works, XI, 179. 
4Ibid., PP~ 134-135. 
3Ibid., p. 134 ... 
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Aristotelian terms as a fundamental nisus of man toward 
his own moral destiny. 
ii. The Role of Reason 
Butler often brings together ·the words nconscience" 
and nreflection .• n 1 The individual prop ens ions operq;te 
almost automatically in a pattern of stimulus and response. 
Reflection intervenes upon this process with conscious 
awareness and approval or disapproval. Reflection is the 
eye of the mind which is often, unfortunately, averted from 
the sphere of its proper concern, just as the eye of the 
body is also often averted from that which man does not want 
to see ... 2 The word rrreflectionn is used by Butler in a very 
broad sense to include intuition as well as all other 
cognitive acts which intrude upon the automatic expression 
of our propensions~ 
Butler does not explicitly define the word nreason .. re 
In sermon xii however, it is very clearly distinguished from 
all affections and appetites.. "Understanding and temper, 
r~ason and affection, are as distinct ideas, as reason and 
hungerr and one would think could no more be confounded. 113 
1Ibid., pp. 9, 12, 13, 14, 41, 59, 61, et4 passim. 
2Ibid., PP~ 177-180. 3Ibid., pp. 231-232. 
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An examination of the passages in which Butler uses the 
word "reason" suggests (tb,ough not conclusively) that its 
meaning is less broad than that of •~reflection.'~ Wherever 
Butler uses the word "reason'J it is possible to interpret 
his meaning in terms of logical/ or calculating activity: 
i.e. the perception of agreement or of disagreement of 
1 
ideas. It is in this sense that we shall use the term in 
this discussion. 
In the exercise of conscience we have first the 
intuitively formulated value judgments. As indicated 
earlier 1 we are using the word "intuition 1 " not in an occult 
or mysterious sense, but only in the sense of introspective 
discernment of propensions. The fulfilment of these pro-
pensions has value. Also 1 in this section, the inclusive 
term nw,alue judgment" is used with primary reference to 
virtue as the end or value being sought. 
The work of calculating reason begins with these 
value judgments as given. The first task 1 logically and 
chronologically, is that of articulating to oneself and/or 
to others the nature of these basic values. In connection 
lTerminology of John Locke 1 in An Essay Concerning 
Human Understandinq 1 Bk. IV 1 chaps. i 1 xvii 1 et~ passim. 
\ 
} 
with his own work ;sutler writes: 11It appeared of use to 
unfold that inward conviction, and lay it open in a more 
1 
explicit manner, than I had seen done 0 •~ 
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The most important, and primary task of reason is 
that of implementing value judgments by appraising specific 
acts in relation to these valu~s. Thus Butler refers to 
the fact that men "go against their reason, and contradict 
a more important interest at a distance, for one nearer, 
. . •• 2 though of less cons~derat~on, Here, the value judgments 
are given as part of the data upon which reason operates. 
In another passage, Butler rather shrewdly suggests 
that one might examine himself by first assuming his own 
uprightness and then asking how oneis character would 
probably be misrepresented if an enemy were seeking to do so, 
11There is scarce a man living but could, from the most 
transient, superficial view of himself answer this question.~3 
Another test of conduct is to suppose oneself in the place 
h . t' 4 of the person toward w om one ~s ac ~ng ... In both these 
cases also, one sees the calculating aspects of reason as it 
1Butler, Works, II, 7o 
3Ibid.,. p.. 182. 4 Ibido, p. 183 o 
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seeks to implement inu~tively established value judgments. 
Usually~ the allusion to reason is made more simply thust 
that it behooves a rational man to reflect upon his actions 
and compare them with his own deepest sense of values, 
rather than to rush headlong into a course of action which 
l 
has not been thus examined. 
Butler might have laid more stress upon the activ-
ity of reason in moral judgment than he actually does. For 
instance, let us consider the judgments of conscience with 
regard to 1'fidelity," 10honour, .. and ••strict justice .. " 2 
Butler sees no way of explaining these familia+ judgments 
other than that of regarding them as immediate and intui-
tive.. lt is significant to note that Butler is a bit 
puzzled by these judgments, and feels that they somehow do 
not fit into his general criteria of virtuew He toys with 
the idea that they may~ after all, be somehow reducible to 
the idea of benevolence; or possibly "an inferior kind of 
virtues and vices, somewhat like natural beauties or 
deformities; or lastly, plain exceptions to the general 
3 
rule. 11 
1Ibidw 1 p~ 128, e~. passim. 
3Ibid.r p. 227n. 
2 Ibid., p. 227 .. 
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Brand Blanshard suggests a line of thought, which, 
if considered by Butler, might well have been utilized to 
implement his quizzical reflection upon the possibility of 
reducing honesty and honor to considerations of benevolence. 
Blanshard writes: 
Now the keeping of engagements, the telling of truth, 
and the doing of justice are essential parts of the 
community's plan of life. To violate them officially 
is to do far more than to injure a particular person; 
it is to challenge and disrupt this plan of life as a 
whole •••• To forsake engagements, truth, and 
justice whenever a prospect of particular advantage 
comes in view would be to weaken the claims of these 
things throughout the range of our conduct; it would 
tear a huge hole in the network of relations that 
make society possible. ~ •• What really moves ms is · 
the sense--a.vague sense, admitted--of remoter reper-
cussions, of what the breach of princille would mean 
for the fabric of our life as a whole~ 
We agree with what has been found implicitly in 
Butler's exposition: that judgments of value can only be 
intuitive and that it is the task of reason to implement 
the realization of these values. We suggest, however, that 
in some cases, as suggested above with regard to principles 
of honesty, there is too much dependence upon immediate and 
intuitive "reflex approbationn where the judgment or 
principle in question might have been regarded as an 
implementation by reason of some other basic value. 
lBrand Blanshard, wThe Impasse in Ethics--and a Way 
Out, n The Philosophical Forum.,i7 · (1959960) , pp. 8-9. 
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We have noted that Butler agrees quite largely 
with Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and even with Hume in finding 
some kind of empirical intuition rather than rational 
intuition to be at the heart of moral judgment. We have 
criticized Butler for not assigning a larger role to reason 
in some cases. It must be noted, however, that Butler•s 
conscience is relatively more deliberative and less 
immediately intuitive than is the "moral sense 11 of 
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. 
According to Butler, human nature includes a variety 
of propensions, the satisfaction of which constitutes value. 
0 Of supreme importance is the desire for virtue, or for 
integrated wholeness. These are the basic intuitive ele-
ments in moral judgment. Of great importance, however, is 
the fact that moral judgment also entails the articulation 
of these values, the appraisal of specific situations, and 
the appropriate organization of conduct in relation to both. 
While recognizing the basic intuitive elements in moral 
judgment, Butler also emphasizes the delib6r.ative aspects 
much more than do those for whom it is based upon a 11moral 
sense. 11 
For Butler, reason and empirical intuition are 
o· 
significantly interwoven in the judgments of cQnscience. 
Reason alone, whatever any one may wish, is not in 
reality a sufficient motive of virtue in such a 
creature as manr but this reason joined with those 
affections which God has impressed upon his heart; 
and when these are allowed scope to exercise them-
.selves, but under strict government and direction of 
reason; then it is we act suitably to our nature, 
and to the circumstances God has placed us in~1 
lButler, Works, II, 98. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Throughout the foregoing chapters we have combined 
exposition with evaluation of Butler's moral philosophy. 
In this chapter we shall set forth a summary statement of 
each. In section one we shall sketch the main outlines of 
Butler's moral philosophy, and in section two the main out-
lines of our evaluation. 
1. Butler's Moral Philosophy Summarized 
The concept of morality has often been reduced to 
that of an external demand laid upon the individualr either 
by God, or by society, or by a sovereign ruler. For Butler, 
morality rises f~om the demand of one~s own nature. The 
summons of conscience is a summons to be oneself in the 
deepest sense, and thus to realize one's true destiny as a 
human being. Morality thus finds its basis in nature rather 
tnan in convention. In this respect, Butler sides with 
Platoi Aristotle, the stoics, and the English rationalists 
against Hobbes, Mandeville, and Locke. 
From this concept of morality follows the necessity 
-136-
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of properly understanding the essential nature of roan. 
Butler's moral philosophy begins with an examination of 
human nature, and with the conviction that man's psychic 
structure represents a fixed and determinat~ aspect of 
reality. We find first in human nature a variety of pro-
pensions toward particular objectives. Among these are 
such widely diverse impulses as hunger, personal ambition, 
sex, ' 1desire of esteem from others, n 1 'Pdelight in the pros-
perity of others"2 and "compassion for their distress~s,n3 
4 
and love of arts. Butler does not include revenge, and 
direct ill will among the primary propensions. These 
arise when legitimate desires are frustrated, and when the 
proper poise and balance of roan ~'s "inward frame•r has been 
disrupted. 
The prope:as.ions are equally "interested" in that the 
active agent must inevitably constitute the locus 1 both of 
desire, and of satisfaction upon its fulfilment. At the 
same time, these propensions are equally "disinterested" in 
that desire is focussed upon a particular objective; not 
upon the welfare of the agent. The primary propensions are 
1Butler, Works, II, 40. 2Ibid., p. 94. 
3Ibid. 4Ibid., p. 25. 
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seen simply as spontaneous drives toward their own fulfil-
ment. 
This point is of perennial importance to man•s self-
understanding~ and to moral philosophy. It was particularly 
relevant to the mentality of Butler•s day. To those who pro-
fessed supreme attraction to the ideal of egoism and self-
interest, it had to be shown that happiness is not gained in 
this way. The self finds happiness only as it finds self-
fulfilment and it finds self-fulfilment only as it transcends 
itself in the scope of its interests and concerns. It was 
essential to Butler 1 s purposes to show that benevolence is 
not a great deal different from other desires in this 
respect. In all cases, one pursues objectives because of 
their own intrinsic value and power to elicit fascination~ 
To do otherwise is to undercut whatever satisfaction one 
might find in these objectives as ends. 
As a rational being man reflects upon the remoter 
consequences of his primary propensions and recognizes that 
certain of them have a primary bearing upon his own welfare, 
while others are primarily relevant to the welfare of other 
people. With this awareness, man comes to regulate his 
actions for maximum benefit to himself and to society. 
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His own total welfare is objectified as an endr and pursued 
under the regulative principle of sel£-love. The welfare 
of others is objectified and sought under the regulative 
principle of benevolence. 
The relation between self-love and the particular 
propens.ions is a key point in l3utler'ls moral philosophy. 
There is here what might be loosely called a paradox. The 
objective of maximizing one 1 s own happiness is undercut when 
pursued directly. It can only be realized through the pur-
suit of other objectives. 
Immoderate self-love does very ill consult its own 
interest; and, how much soever a paradox it may 
appear, it is certainly true, that even from self-
love we should endeavor to get over all inordinate 
regard to, and consideration of ourselves.l 
An empirical description of human nature is highly 
incomplete without recognizing a regulative faculty which 
is superior in status and in authority to all others. This, 
of course, is the conscience. Conscience seeks to integrate 
all of man's propensities, including the regulative facul-
ties of benevolence and self-love, according to the due 
proportion of his 1•real10 nature. 
1Ibido 1 P• 19lo 
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Under'the rational control of benevolence·and self-
love, a degree of order is achieved among the various pro-
pensions. Complete order is not achieved 1 however, without 
the exercise of· conscience. Conscreence is the law of one·r s 
nature, and as such calls for the due proportion which 
constitutes that naturew Benevolence and self-love each 
represent a partial aspect of man's nature while conscience 
transcends both to include the whole. 
There is also a second fundamental respect in which 
the inclusiveness of conscience is greater than that of 
benevolence or of self-love. The latter seek fulfilment in 
completed overt acts. Conscience is concerned, not only 
with overt acts, but also, and more fundamentally, with the 
state of psychic orderedness from which these acts arise. 1 
The due proportion which comprises virtue, is first and 
J 
primarily a proportion in the very nature of man rather than 
among his completed overt acts. 
Conscience also differs from all other regulative 
faculties in that it carries with it a unique sense of 
authorityr and of urgency. The sense of authoritative 
prompting is an additional factor to the discernment of right 
1Ibid., I, 400; II, 201, et •• passim .. 
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as ftight. One is under obligation to obey this prompting 
even though he fails to discern that it is also to his 
ultimate advantage to do so. 
For Butler, human nature is to be regarded as a 
unity, and not as a mere totality of propensities~ The 
interrelationship of parts has two dimensions: namely, ~the 
relations which the several appetites and passions in the 
inward frame have to each other"1 and "the supremacy of 
reflection or conscience."2 There is relatively more stress 
upon the latter than upon the former. That is~ in describ-
ing human nature as a unity, Butler particularly emphasizes 
the idea o£ hierarchy and of subordination of lower to 
higher faculties. Thus, "the superiority o£ this principle 
[ re£lection J to all others is the chief respect which forms 
the constitution.n3 
In the total expression of personality1 each part o£ 
man'"s "internal frame" 4 is of crucial importance to the 
essence o£ the whole. However, the horizontal relationship 
of parts is more one of external balance, and of mutual 
limitation than of interdependence. 
3rbid., p. 69n; cf.,. p. 9. 
4Ibid., pp. 9, 108f et, passim. 
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Butler assumes that human nature is a fixed and 
uniform reality, and thus that the moral destiny of one 
man will not differ from that of another. It is furthe~ 
assumed that the self-fulfilment of one person will in no 
way conflict with that of another person. 
An important aspect of Butler's moral philosophy is 
the conviction that duty is perfectly·. consonant with inter·-
est. In the elaboration of this point one may distinguish 
two lines of thought. On the one hand, Butler finds within 
human experience that virtue has an overwhelming tendency 
to be conjoined with personal interest and advantage • 
Furthermore, with Kant, he finds in the moral consciousness 
the conviction that duty and interest ought to and must 
ultimately cdhcide. On the other hand, we find also the 
Platonic emphasis.upon health of soul as an intrinsic value. 
To inflict harm upon another is to inflict harm upon oneself.· 
It is to 11disorder the inward constitution, unsettle the 
adjustments, and alter the proportions, which formed it, 
and in which the uprightness of its mak~ consisted.rr1 
Follow~ng this line of thought we see virtue as a state of 
psychic health and poise, and thus its own reward. 
1Ibid.' I I 124 .. 
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Butler leaves certain aspects of his moral_philos-
opp~J without very explicit exposition. For instance, 
exactly what is it which constitutes the value of virtue 
as a state to be desired, and what is the relation of this 
value to others? Obviously, virtue is something which man 
desires, just as he desires other 11 objects 11 [objectives] • 
Virtue is not simply a desire to maximize the realization 
of all other desires. It is rather a desire for a certain 
orderedness which is prior to the actual fulfilment of 
other impulses. It leads to the ordered fulfilment of these 
other impulses but yet is to a certain extent independent of 
them. There is thus something a bit intricate about the 
relation of virtue to other values. In a sense it is 
closely bound up with all others, and in another sense it 
is independent of them. 
Is then the state of virtue valuable because it 
results in the ordered fulfilment of other desires; ~~ it 
simply indefinably goodi or is it valuable because it satis-
fies a fundamental and irreducible nisus, or impulse of man 
to achieve such a state as his real destiny? It is evident 
that Butler would not accept the first of these alternatives. 
Alternative three seems to correspond best with 'the general 
tenor of Butler•s thought. 
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Closely related·to this question is that of the 
cognitive grounds upon which conscience operates. Butler 
has certain affinities here with Shaftesbury and with Humew 
Virtue seems to be identifiable as such, ~imply because of 
an e~perienced propension of the soul toward its admiration 
in others and ~ts realization in oneself. 
It may now be of some value to note further the 
place of Butler~s moral philosophy within the larger frame-
' . 
work o£ British ethical Eheory in the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth century~ According to Thomas Hobbes and 
John Locke, morality was essentially a matter o£ convention. 
According to Hobbes the convention was established and 
enforced by the ruleri .according to Locke it was established 
and enforced by God. - In opposition to Hobbes and Locke was 
the rationalist approach to ethical theory. Here it was 
insisted that morality is ultimately grounded in the 
structure of reality itself. The rationalists further 
insisted that moral discernment is pure~y and exclusively an 
act of rational cognition. 
With Shaftesbury, Butler accepted the rationalist 
concept of reality as an ordered wnole. It was this 
concept which constituted a firm ontological basis for 
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regarding moral judgment as cognitive rather than as emotive 
in import. Unlike the rationalists 1 however, Butler and 
Shaftesbury find a large place for empirical or esthetic 
intuition in moral judgment. One of the differences between 
Butler and Shaftesbury, however( is the fact that Butler's 
conscience is relatively more deliberative and less immedi-
ately intuitive in .its operation than .i~ the 11moral sense 11 
of Shaftesbury. 
Following the work of Butler was that of David Hume. 
Hume agreed with Butler in regarding certain feelings, 
rather than pure reason, as the key to moral judgment. How-
ever 1 unlike Butler and the rationalists; Hume does not 
supply an ontological foundation for his moral philosophy: 
hence moral judgment becomes essentially emotive rather 
than cognitive in import. 
There is thus a sense in which Butler stands as a 
bridge between Shaftesbury and the rationalists, and another 
sense in which he stands as a bridge between Pavid Hume and 
the rationalists •. 
2~ Evaluation of Butler Summarized 
In this section we shall indicate first those 
aspechs of Butler's ethical theory which we regard as weakest, 
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or as principally defective. We shall then proceed, in 
conclusion, to summarize that which we regard as most 
penetrating, and of particular value in Butler's system. 
i. Negative Evaluation 
British empiricism ~as always been highly analytic, 
and more prone to discern plurality, than to discern inter-
dependence and unity. -+-Butler's concept of man suffers from 
this overly analytic and overly pluralistic tendency of 
thought. Within human nature Butler seems to find a sort of 
mechanical and atomic divisibility. Each part is essential 
to the essence of the whole, but rela~ed only externally to 
the other parts. While avoiding the dang~r of destructively 
assimilating one aspect of mants nature to another, Butler 
£ails to grasp the complex interdependence of these aspects 
in relation to each other. The analytic discrimination of 
various 11parts" is an over simplification of human nature .. 
Butler insists that human desires are focused upon 
objectives which are in some significant sen~e external to 
the self. ~utler•s discernment at this point is profoundly 
true. What we would like to point out, however, is that the 
entire issue of motivation and its relation to subjective 
states of oneself is complex and full of perplexity. It is 
~\ 
147 
one which warrants a great deal more precise and painstak-
ing analysis than that which Butler gives to it. Butler 
has been content with a simple prophetic and empirical 
manifesto: that man only achieves satisfaction by pursuing 
objectives for their own sake. We are neither criticising 
nor taking issue with Butler at this point; but we are 
seeking to indicate the limitations in scope of his work. 
We conclude that though Butler was correct, he leaves a 
great deal yet to be said on the subject of disinterested-
ness. 
Basic to much of Butler•s moral philosophy is an 
ontological description of human nature; and indissolubly 
bound up with Butler•s ontology are certain theological and 
pre-Darwinian concepts of teleology. Butler finds human 
nature, as well as the discernments of conscience to be 
largely fixed and uniform throughout the human race. Thus 
Butler is limited in his ability to contribute to the 
contemporary issue of nominalism vs. legalism in ethical 
theoryw Butler also finds that 11 the inward frame of man does 
in a peculiar manner answer to the external condition and 
1 
circumstances of life, in which he is placed.n For Butler 
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this is a matter of preestablished harmony. Some contempor-
ary descriptions of man and society find 1 rather a mixed 
situation of harmony, conflict, and ongoing mutual adjust-
ments between individuals. 
Another criticism of Butler is partly related to 
his unduly pluralistic emphasis. In setting forth the ideal 
pattern of man~s nature, Butler places relatively too much 
stress upon the hierarchical order of authority and relatively 
too little upon the horizontal relationship between parts. 
It is from considering the relations which the several 
appetites and passions in the inward frame have to 
each other, and, above all, the supremacy of reflection 
or conscience, [underlining mine] that we get the idea 
of the system or constitution of human nature~l 
Thus we are left with far too little criteria for discerning 
the proper relationship between the various particular pro- . 
pensions and between benevolence and self-love. We are told 
that conscience is the ultimate guide and authority, but very 
little as to the cognitive grounds upon which conscience 
operates. 
A final criticism of Butler concerns the question of 
duty and external advantage. In Greek philosophy, virtue as 
a fundamental state of balance and health of soul is 
libid., p. 9, cf. p. 19n. 
149 
decidedly its own reward. Butler suggests the same idea 
in many passages,.while in others he detracts from this 
insight by appealing tO' external rewards, both within and 
beyond present history as a means of recommending virtue. 1 
One aspect of this matter concerns the relation of 
the virtuous man to his contemporary society. Butler holds 
that society itself is prone to bestow rewards upon the 
virtuous man. The 11persecuted prophetu ideal of virtue is 
not excluded, but neither is it given adequate recognition. 
Here Butler is closer to Aristotle than to Plato. In the 
ideal character of Butler•s ethical discourses; one catches 
echoes of Aristotle•s well-adjusted young aristocrat. An 
exception to this characterization is the statement that 
11poverty and disgrace, tortures and death,n2 are less con-
trary to human nature than is moral evil. In general; 
however, one finds an overemphasis, upon the prudential 
element in virtue. The ideal character of Butler•s as well 
as of Aristotle •·s ethics is disappointingly and uninspiringly 
normal. With reference to Aristotle 1 s Nicomachean Ethics, 
lcf., A. P. Eogers, A Short History of Ethics, Greek 
and Modern (London; Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1921), p. 175. 
2Butler, Works, II, 10. 
,~ 
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Bertrand Russell writes: '~What he has to say is what will 
be useful to comfortable men of weak passions; but he has 
nothing to say to those who are possessed by a god or a 
devil1 or whom outward misfortune drives to despair.n1 
This critique is partly applicable to Butler•s moral 
philosophy. 
ii. Positive Evaluation 
Though Butler 1 s emp±ricism leaves us with an exces-
sive analytic plurality, it has the compensating merit of 
doing justice to the many-sided, and manifold fullness of 
human nature. Butler rightly discerns in experience the 
irreducible reality of benevolent desire, and the irreducible 
sense of authority which attaches to judgments of conscience. 
Also the relation of self-love to disinterested propensions 
is difficult to explain, but Butler seeks to do full 
empirical justice to each. 
Butler 1 s empirical method in ethics also has the 
merit of beginning at the only feasible beginning point: 
namely, with the self. One does not begin with some 
a priori or otherwise abstract principle. 
1 Bertrand Russell, Historv of Western Philosophy 
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.i 1946), p. 206. 
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Though one must inevitably begin with oneself, and 
with one's innate urges toward self-fulfilment, these urges 
are themselves constituted by concerns which reach beyond 
the self. Here, Butler articulates a very important point, 
thoughr as we have noted, he leaves a great deal ot careful 
psychological analysis yet to be done. When we are he~lthyr 
physically and emotionally, we find self-fulfilment in the 
spontaneous pursuit of various objectives other than that of 
increasing our own happiness. The particular objective of 
maximizing onets own happiness must be kept within very 
definite bounds or else it defeats itself. This is a point 
which Butler asserts repeatedly, though with very little 
elaboration. If the matter were to be explained further it 
might be shown that undue preoccupation with one's welfare 
is a defensive reaction. It undermines itself by destroying 
the spontaneity which is necessary for fulfilment of desire. 
Self-love, though necessary and legitimate in some degree, 
becomes a constricting and destructive factor when excessive. 
Although Butlerrs ethical theory has a very prudenti-
ally conservative tone, and although the heroic (or 11perse-
cuted prophet••) motif is largely absent, the concept of 
disinterestedness is an important step in the right 
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direction. The early eighteenth century mentality would 
have decisively rejected anything further than this. 
Butlerls approach in this respect was brilliantly adapted 
to the needs and possibilities of his own time. 
' Butler also had the merit of discerning that direct 
ill will and revenge are types of expression which rise from 
a lack of integrated harmony within oneself. This sort of 
disequilibrium with its concomitant manifestations may occur 
under duress, but it does not represent the real nature of 
man. 
Butler•s concept of virtue as the realization of 
one•·s own essential nature is wholesome and basically sound. 
It properly discerns that morality is not the foisting upon 
human nature of some external demand, but rather a demand 
which rises from one's own nature. More specifically it is 
the demand of one 1 s nature to achieve integrated wholeness. 
Furthermore, the structure of man•s nature is a part of the 
total structure of reality. Thus morality is se~n to rest 
upon a firm ontological basis. It is this ontological 
ground which gives to moral judgment its full cognitive and 
normative significance. 
With Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, Butler dis-
cerned that moral judgment issues from certain specific 
0 
0 
0 
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feelings: that it cannot be based upon rational intuition 
alone. With the rationalists, on the other hand, Butler 
recognized the deliberative and reflective aspect of 
conscience, thus.modifying the sheer immediacy of esthetic 
intuitionism, 
These are aspects of Butler's thought which give 
permanent value to the Sermons as a penetrating study of 
man•s moral experience. 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study isito provide a critical 
interpretation of Bishop Butler •·s moral philosophy.. The 
objective is two-fold, including both exposition and evalu-
ation. 
The concept of morality has sometimes peen reduced 
to that of an external demand laid upon the individual, 
either by God, or by society, or by a sovereign ruler. Of 
fundamental value in Butler~s moral philosophy is the 
insight that morality rises from the demand of one•s own 
nature. The summons of conscience is a summons to be one-
self in the deepest sense, and thus to realize one•s true 
destiny as a human being. Morality thus finds its basis in 
nature rather than in convention. In this respect Butler 
sides with Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the English 
rationalists against Hobbes, Mandeville, and Locke .. 
Butler further agrees with the classical Greek and with the 
rationalist tradition in regarding reality as an ordered 
whole, with which the structure of man~s individual nature 
is~continuous. It is this ontological ground which gives to 
moral judgment its full cognitive and normatiYe significance. 
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Within man•s nature Butler finds first a variety of 
desires which are directed toward particular objectives~ 
These are equally •rinterestedn in that the active agent 
must inevitably constitute the locus, both of desire 1 and of 
satisfaction upon its fulfilment. At the same time these 
desires are equally "disinterested"" in that desire is 
focused upon a particular objectivei not upon the welfare 
or satisfaction of the self. 
Among these fundamental propensions, or desir~s of 
man's nature is that of benevolence. The existence of this 
impulse along with the others is an empirical fact-which 
cannot be legitimately denied. Furthermore, the status of 
benevolence as both interested and disinterested is exactly 
the same as that of any other desire. 
Butlerls concept of disinterestedness, and his 
inclusion of benevolence along with the other primary 
desires represents an insight which is of fundamental impor-
tance and value to manTs self unde~standing. Happiness 
cannot be achieved through preoccupation with oners own 
satisfaction and welfare. One finds happiness only through 
self-fulfilment, and one finds self-fulfilment only by 
following the deeper impulses of his nature in concerns 
which reach beyond the self. 
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The particular propensions represent a plurality of 
conflicting interests. As a rational being man reflects 
upon the remoter consequences of his actions and recognizes 
that certain of them have a primary bearing upon his own 
welfare, while others are primarily relevant to the welfare 
of other people. With this awareness, man comes to 
regulate his actions for maximum benefit to himself and to 
society. His own total welfare is objectified and sought 
under the reguLative principle of self-love. The welfare of 
others is objectified and sought under the regulative 
principle of benevolence. We must here note parenthetically 
that Butler uses the word 11benevolencen in two distinct 
senses~ In one sense the word refers to a simple fundamental 
desire, while in the case now under discussion it refers to 
a regulative principle. 
The regulative principles of benevolence and self-
love are in turn subordinated to conscience. Conscience is 
the law of one's nature and as such calls for the ndue 
proportion 11 which constitutes that nature. · Benevolence and 
I ' 
self-love each represent a part1al aspect of man's nature 
while conscience transcends both to include.the whole. 
Butler conceives o£ man as an ordered plurality of 
nparts .• tr These various mpartsn of human nature are all 
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regarded as essential to the essence of the whole, but seem 
to be related only externally to each other. Thus the unity 
of human nature upon which Butler lays so much stress~ seems 
to be at most only a federation of independent 11parts." At 
this point Butler clearly reflects the overly analytic and 
the overly pluralistic tendency of British empiricism. 
On the other hand, notwithstanding this overly ana-
lytic strain in Butler•s thought, there is also a very whole-
some emphasis upon the proper ordering of man~s constituent 
"parts" so as to achieve unity and wholeness. One might also 
refer to this ideal as a fundamental state of poise and 
0 equilibrium. It should be noted that virtue is first and 
primarily a state o£ order in the very nature of man rather 
than among his completed overt acts. It is this which 
constitutes man 1·s moral destiny and to which he is summoned 
by the voice of his own conscience. 
With respect to this ideal Butler regards the actual 
situation of man and of society as highly defective, The 
nreal'u nature of man is not to be ascertained statistically. 
It is rather an ideal in relation to which all men stand in 
some degree of imperfect approximation~ 
Butler provides a discerning account of moral evil 
0 in human nature~ He finds that there is not in man any 
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fundamental propension toward evil as there is toward good. 
Thus revenge and direct ill will are not included among the 
primary propensions. These arise when legitimate desires 
are frustrated, and when the proper poise and balance of 
man•s "inward frame" has been disrupted. Thus, man is fallen 
and morally defective insofar as he is disordered. 
An important aspect ot Butler 1 s moral ~hilosophy is 
his insistence upon the coincidence of duty and interest. 
In classical Greek philosophy, virtue as a fundamental 
state ot balance and health of soul is decidedly its own 
reward. Butler emphasizes this point in many passages while 
in others he detracts from this insight by appealing to 
external rewards both within and beyond present history as a 
means of recommending virtue. 
Butler leaves certain aspects of his moral philosophy 
without very explicit exposition. For instance, exactly 
what is it which constitutes the value of virtue as a state 
to be desired? ls virtue valuable because it results in the 
ordered fulfilment of other desires; is it simply indefinably 
goodi or is it valuable because it satisfies a fundamental 
nisus, or impulse of man to achieve such a state as his 
real destiny? It is evident that Butler would not accept 
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the first of these alternatives. Alternatives two and 
three are both possibilities, though the latter seems to 
correspond best with the general tenor of Butler's thought. 
Related to this question is that of the cognitive 
grounds upon which conscience operates. Here also, Butler 
is disappointingly inexplicit, though he has much to say 
about the status and authority of conscience~ Though 
Butler agrees largely with the rationalists with regard to 
the onto-logical grounds o£ moral judgment, he also has the 
merit o£ discerning that moral judgment cannot be based 
upon rational intuition alone. Here he has definite 
affinities with Shaftesbury. Virtue seems to be identifnab.le 
as such, simply because of an experienced propension of the 
soul toward its admiration in others and its realization in 
oneself. Butler, however, supplements the moral sense 
theory by his insistence upon the irreducible sense of 
authority and of urgency attaching to the promptings of 
conscience. Butler also modified the sheer immediacy of 
Shaftesburyts moral sense by recognizing the deliberative 
and reflective aspect of conscience. 
Man •·s fundamental value judgments, including his 
attraction toward virtue, are derived from empirical 
rather than from rational intuition. It is, however, the 
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task of reason to articulate these values, to appraise 
specific situations, and to organize conduct in relation 
to both~ Reason and empirical intuition are thus signif-
icantly interwoven in Butler•s concept of conscience as 
the supreme principle of reflection and of regulation in 
human nature. ~us one finds here, as well as elsewhere 
in Butler•s moral philosophy a via media between rationalism 
and empiricism in which the best insights of both are 
combined. 
